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Best Available Science to Protect Biological Diversity 
Under the National Forest Management Act 
 
by Robert L. Glicksman∗ 
©2007 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The implementation of environmental law and policy often, if not typically, 
proceeds in the face of scientific uncertainty.  Indeed, as Holly Doremus has explained, 
“[t]he most universally recognized feature of environmental problems is the pervasive 
uncertainty that surrounds them.”1  Legislators or administrative agencies crafting 
programs to minimize the risk that exposure to pollution will cause adverse human health 
effects often lack information about the pathways of exposure, the levels at which 
exposure will cause adverse effects, or even about the kinds of adverse effects that may 
result from exposure.  Nearly thirty years ago, Talbot Page described nine characteristics 
that exemplify the kind of “environmental risk” problems typified by the leakage of 
hazardous waste or the production of toxic chemicals.  Four of those characteristics 
emphasized scientific uncertainty, and Page listed “ignorance of mechanism” as the first 
characteristic of an environmental risk problem.2  Scientific uncertainty is no less 
endemic to natural resource management regimes,3 transforming scientific disputes 
concerning such regimes into judgment calls “about how incomplete data are interpreted 
                                                 
∗
 Robert W. Wagstaff Professor of Law, University of Kansas; Member Scholar, Center for Progressive 
Reform.  Thanks to Batsheva Glatt, Class of 2007, for her valuable research and editing assistance.  Thanks 
also go to Andrew Torrance for his useful insights on the scientific method.  Finally, thanks go to all of the 
participants at the conference on “Missing Information:  Environmental Data Gaps in Conservation and 
Chemical Regulation” that was held at the University of Indiana-Bloomington on March 24, 2006 (and 
particularly John Applegate and Robert Fischman, the conference organizers) for a lively and informative 
discussion of issues raised by agency efforts to bridge scientific data gaps in environmental law. 
1
 Holly Doremus, Constitutive Law and Environmental Policy, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 319 (2003) [cited 
hereineafter as Doremus, Constitutive Law].  See also Carol Rose, Environmental Law Grows Up (More or 
Less), and What Science Can Do to Help, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 273 (2005) (stating that “in 
environmental areas the problem of decisionmaking under uncertainty is particularly acute”); Robert N. 
Stavins, What Baseball Can Teach Policymakers, 22 ENVTL. F. 14 (Sept/Oct. 2005) (asserting that 
“[u]ncertainty is an absolutely fundamental aspect of environmental problems and the policies that are 
employed to address those problems” and that “[a]ny analysis that fails to recognize this runs the risk not 
only of being incomplete, but misleading as well”). 
2
 Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 208-09 (1978). 
Cass Sunstein distinguishes between “risk, for which probabilities can be assigned to various outcomes, 
and uncertainty, for which no probabilities can be assigned.” Cass. R. Sunstein, Irreversible and 
Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 848 (2006). 
3
 See, e.g., John M. Volkman, How Do You Learn from A River?  Managing Uncertainty in Species 
Conservation Policy, 74 WASH. L. REV. 719, 723 (1999) (stating that “[e]ven people aware of the problem 
of shrinking biodiversity are likely to be surprised by how much scientific uncertainty there is in species 
conservation policy”).  See generally James Wilson, Scientific Uncertainty, Complex Systems, and the 
Design of Common-Pool Institutions, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 327, 335-47 (Elinor Ostrom et al. 
eds., 2002). 
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and applied.”4  In both areas, “the most important decisions must be made under extreme 
conditions of scientific uncertainty.”5 
 
 Despite this pervasive uncertainty, Congress has directed the agencies responsible 
for administering the environmental statutes to ground their policy decisions in science.  
The implicit assumption reflected in many of these laws is that “science would drive 
decision-making and that agencies could interpret scientific information to set the right 
policies.”6  For a variety of reasons, however, an inquiry that may be posed in scientific 
terms may have no single correct answer, or even no answer at all.7  These may include 
insufficient research, incomplete theoretical understandings, or “merely the great 
complexity of natural and human systems.”8  As a result, as one court put it in an early 
case involving regulation of toxic water pollutants, environmental statutes often present 
agencies with “a veritable paradox [by] calling . . . for knowledge of that which is 
unknown.”9  
 
 Agencies sometimes cope with the responsibility of making science-based 
decisions despite the presence of uncertainty by relying on scientific models or otherwise 
using the limited information available to them to make predictions about the impacts of 
agency decisions on the environment.  In trying to ascertain the effects of a decision on a 
complex ecosystem, for example, an agency may use the known effects of the decision on 
one component of that ecosystem as a surrogate for the effects of the decision on the 
ecosystem as a whole.  These techniques allow agency decisionmakers, by simulating 
reality, to organize available information and plug holes created by unavailable 
information to reach what appears to be a rational and objective conclusion about the 
environmental effects of the action being contemplated.  The use of simulation modeling 
and surrogates in this fashion thus enables agencies to conform to their statutory 
responsibilities to base decisions on scientific considerations, even though a complete 
understanding of the relationships between the actions they are proposing to take, or 
authorize others to take, and the resulting environmental effects may be beyond their 
current capabilities or impossible ever fully to ascertain. 
 
 The reliance by pollution control and natural resource management agencies on 
scientific models or on surrogate parameters to make decisions under federal 
environmental legislation has generated significant controversy, despite its utility in 
addressing the paradox created by statutory mandates to make decisions based on 
unavailable information.  Scientific models are built upon assumptions, which are often 
based on value judgments and therefore tend to be contested.  Even if agreement exists on 
the assumptions upon which a model is based, there may be disagreements about the 
applicability of the model to a particular problem or situation.  Moreover, competing 
                                                 
4
 Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural Resource Regulation, 
26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1, 3 (2005). 
5
 A. Dan Tarlock, Who Owns Science?, 10 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L.J. 135, 141 (2002). 
6
 James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy:  Conflicts Between Models and Participation 
in Environmental Law and Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 909 (2005). 
7
 See STEPHEN BOCKING, SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 27 (2004). 
8
 Id. at 26. 
9
 Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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models or differential applications of a single model may yield starkly divergent 
predictions about the effects of an agency’s decision on the environment.  As a result, 
litigation concerning the use of simulation models and surrogate parameters by 
environmental and resource management agencies has been plentiful. 
 
 This article considers the lessons that may be drawn from the recent controversy 
created by one federal agency’s shifting approach to the use of models and surrogates.  
The National Forest Management Act (NFMA)10 delegates to the National Forest Service 
(Forest Service, or Service) the responsibility to develop land and resource management 
plans (LRMPs) for units of the National Forest System (NFS)11 and to make site-specific 
decisions about the use of those units in a manner consistent with the plans.12  The 
NFMA charges the Forest Service with the task of issuing regulations governing the land 
use planning process that, among other things, “provide for diversity of plant and animal 
communities based on the suitability and capability of the specific land area.”13  The 
Service has encountered difficulty in carrying out its responsibility to issue and apply 
those regulations because of the enormous complexity of the ecosystems within the 
forests under its jurisdiction.  To minimize the uncertainty it faces in predicting what 
impact a particular proposed action, such as a timber sale, will have on the diversity of 
plant and animal species in the affected forest, the Forest Service has turned to the use of 
models and surrogates.  For years, acting under land use planning regulations issued by 
the agency in 1982, it identified management indicator species (MIS) that it determined 
were representative of the health of the ecosystem as a whole.  The MIS were supposed 
to act as surrogates for the impact of activities such as timber sales on plant and animal 
diversity.  The agency’s aim was to predict the effects of management actions on the 
selected MIS and to monitor the fate of the MIS after the action was taken to determine 
whether the action was interfering with diversity.  If it was, suitable changes in 
management approaches could then be made.14 
 
The process of monitoring the effect of management actions such as timber sales 
on MIS, however, turned out to be a burdensome one, requiring the Forest Service to 
count MIS populations.  The Forest Service began using the health of the habitat of the 
MIS as a surrogate for the health of the MIS themselves.  Thus, MIS habitat served as a 
surrogate, or proxy, for the health of the MIS, which in turn served as a surrogate for the 
diversity of plant and animal communities in the ecosystem as a whole.  When litigants 
challenged this “proxy-on-proxy” approach to compliance with the Forest Service’s 
requirement to provide for diversity in the planning process, the courts were unable to 
agree on whether this approach is consistent with the NFMA.15 
 
In 2000, the Clinton Administration amended the NFMA planning regulations, 
but the Bush Administration quickly replaced those regulations with its own approach to 
                                                 
10
 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687. 
11
 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a). 
12
 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i). 
13
 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B). 
14
 See infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text. 
15
 See infra notes 156-66 and accompanying text. 
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planning.  The Forest Service’s 2005 regulations completely scrap the agency’s 
obligation to track the impact of management actions on MIS, based on the agency’s 
conclusion that the MIS approach had been unreliable and flawed.  In its place, the 
regulations require that the Service ensure the maintenance of biological diversity by 
taking into account the “best available science” and by focusing in most cases on the 
effect of management actions on diversity at the ecosystem rather than the species level.16  
The fate of the agency’s latest approach to dealing with scientific uncertainty in fulfilling 
the NFMA’s diversity mandate is not yet clear. A federal district court enjoined 
implementation of the 2005 regulations due to the Forest Service’s noncompliance with 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)17and the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA),18 but it did not address the legality of the regulations under the NFMA.19 
 
This article explores the Forest Service’s implementation of the NFMA’s 
diversity mandate to illustrate the benefits and disadvantages of using scientific models 
and surrogates techniques that allow agencies to fulfill their mandates to make science-
based decisions in the face of incomplete information and scientific uncertainty.  Part II 
explores the paradox created when statutes require agencies to protect environmental 
resources by basing their decisions on science, despite limited knowledge of the manner 
in which the kinds of activities subject to the agency’s jurisdiction have affected those 
resources in the past or will affect them in the future.  It also describes the utility of 
modeling and surrogates as techniques for resolving the paradox, and how the federal 
courts have reacted to challenges to reliance on these analytical techniques.  Part III 
analyzes the use of models and surrogates in the specific context of the Forest Service’s 
efforts to comply with the NFMA’s requirement to protect the diversity of plant and 
animal species in the land use planning process that governs use of the national forests.  
Part IV provides a list of criteria by which modeling and similar simulation techniques 
should be judged and assesses how the Forest Service’s efforts to implement the diversity 
requirement fare using those criteria as standards.  The criteria include recognition of the 
limits of scientific knowledge, collaboration, transparency, flexibility, and accountability. 
 
II. BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND THE USE OF MODELING AND SURROGATES TO 
BRIDGE DATA GAPS 
 
Because scientific uncertainty is such a pervasive feature of the analysis and 
resolution of environmental problems, administrative agencies responsible for protecting 
human health and the environment or for managing natural resources such as those 
contained on the lands owned by the federal government often must make decisions 
without access to what would appear to be crucial information.20  The situation facing 
                                                 
16
 See infra notes 198-239 and accompanying text. 
17
 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f. 
18
 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544. 
19
 Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
20
 The scientific uncertainty that surrounds many environmental problems is multi-faceted.  In some cases, 
scientific uncertainty exists because research that is currently feasible has not yet been conducted.  In 
others, it may exist because ethical prohibitions, resource constraints, or limits on available 
experimentation methods make it impossible to generate the information that would reduce the uncertainty.  
See Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181, 190-91. 
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these agencies involves what may be called “bounded rationality”; the decisionmaker’s 
effort to understand the implications of its actions is bounded by constraints on its ability 
to gather or analyze information.  Yet the statutes under which these agencies operate 
typically require that their decisions be the product of scientific analysis. 
 
At times, Congress has recognized the uncertain milieu in which an agency’s 
decisionmaking process is steeped by allowing the agency to make its decisions based on 
the “best available science,” usually without defining, however, what constitutes the best 
available scientific information or how the agency is supposed to go about accumulating 
or assessing it.  Agencies have developed different methods for enabling them to make 
decisions with potential effects on the environment despite missing or incompletely 
understood information.  Among these important techniques is the use of models or 
surrogates that produce simulations of the real world based on limited information.  This 
part discusses the problem of bounded rationality, how it affects the statutory obligations 
of agencies to factor science into their determinations, and both the benefits and limits of 
modeling and the use of surrogates as techniques for dealing with bounded rationality. 
 
A. Bounded Rationality, Science, and Value Judgments In 
Environmental and Natural Resource Management Laws 
  
 The need to make decisions in the absence of complete information is not unique 
to the federal agencies responsible for protecting human health and the environment or 
for managing the federal lands and the resources they contain.  The behavioral school of 
economics posited during the 1950s that various kinds of institutional decisionmaking are 
subject to what advocates of that school of thought referred to as “bounded rationality.”21  
The essential insight of the behavioral economists 
 
was that decision-making in any institution is “bounded” by time, resources, and 
cognitive constraints that make it virtually impossible to verify that the solution 
chosen is optimal.  In other words, an effort to find the “best” solution to a 
problem will be hindered by time and cost constraints that limit the search for 
alternative solutions and information for measuring which solution is better.  In 
addition, individuals are subject to significant cognitive limitations that restrict 
their ability to make the judgments necessary to pick an optimal solution.22 
 
If the desire to reach the optimal decision were not to be crippled by the presence 
of bounded rationality, the decisionmaker would have to find a solution to the problem at 
hand that was “good enough,” such as by basing the solution on the known factors that 
the decisionmaker regards as most relevant and important.  As a result, the best that 
organizations facing bounded rationality can do is to rely on “’rules of thumb’ or 
‘heuristics,’ that take into account real-world limitations.”23  Although this kind of 
decisionmaking is not based on “comprehensive rationality,” it is nevertheless rational 
                                                 
21
 SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:  RESTORING A PRAGMATIC 
APPROACH 23 (2003). 
22
 Id.  
23
 Id. 
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because it seeks to advance the organization’s goals despite the existence of limited 
knowledge and uncertainty. 
 
Environmental agencies often engage in the kind of decisionmaking techniques 
described by the behavioral economists.  They do so, as Carol Rose has explained, 
because policymaking bodies such as legislatures and administrative agencies, unlike 
scientists, “have to make up their minds on the basis of very incomplete information. . . .  
Doing nothing is a decision too, and — like doing the wrong thing — it can be a decision 
that makes environmental problems much worse.”24   
 
Reliance on rules of thumb, heuristics, or other techniques for facilitating 
decisionmaking in the face of scientific uncertainty necessarily requires that the agencies 
employing those techniques move beyond science as the sole basis for decision.25  An 
agency that relies on heuristics to make decisions based on limited information generally 
seeks to extrapolate the available information to a different context.  Suppose, for 
example, that an agency that has conducted tests in which animals were exposed to toxic 
chemicals at high doses wants to determine the likely effects of exposing humans to those 
same chemicals at much lower doses.  If the agency has no data points in the low-dose 
region at which humans are likely to be exposed, it must extrapolate the test data in the 
high-dose region of the dose-response curve to the low-dose region for which information 
is lacking.  If an agency responsible for protecting the vitality of an ecosystem decides 
that it is impractical to accumulate the information needed to assess the impact of a 
management action on the entire ecosystem, it may decide to focus on the status of one 
resource as a proxy for the status of the ecosystem as a whole. 
 
Those kinds of extrapolations, however, are no longer exclusively scientific 
determinations.  Instead, they depend on value judgments inherent in the selection of the 
methods by which the extrapolation from known to missing information will be made, as 
there may be multiple possible methods, all of which fit the known facts equally well.26 
                                                 
24
 Rose, supra note 1, at 290. 
25
 As Wendy Wagner has explained: 
“Science” has been conveniently, albeit roughly, defined by the Supreme Court as that knowledge 
“derived by [or grounded in] the scientific method.”  Information is generally not scientific 
knowledge . . . unless it can be supported by a “scientifically valid” “reasoning or methodology.”  
In most cases this requires the ability to test a hypothesis in a replicable way or to use methods 
that scientists have generally accepted as valid.   When an experiment or observation cannot 
realistically be conducted (or replicated) to answer a hypothesis or question, the question leaves 
the province of science and must be resolved in some other way. 
Wagner, supra note 20, at 188. 
26
 See id. at 189.  See also Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2256 (2002) 
(quoting PHILLIP L. WILLIAMS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF TOXICOLOGY 456 (2000)) (“Because the shape of the 
dose-response curve in the low-dose region cannot be verified by measurement, there is no means to 
determine which shape is correct .... [W]hen modeling the risks associated with lower doses, the dose/risk 
range in which regulatory agencies and risk assessors are most frequently interested, there is a wide 
divergence in the risk projected by [different models, all of which fit existing evidence.] ... In fact ... the 
risks predicted by these ... models produce a 70,000-fold variation in the predicted response.”); ROBERT L. 
GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:  LAW AND POLICY 723 (5th ed. 2007) (displaying results 
of alternative extrapolation models for the same data points on dose-response curve for tests to assess 
carcinogenicity of chemical in mice).  “[U]nderstanding the strengths and weaknesses of any particular 
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Thus, as Wendy Wagner has explained, “not only must policymakers gather available 
positive knowledge, but they also must appreciate where this information leaves off and 
the various, scattered uncertainties begin.  In fact, determining the nature and importance 
of these various knowledge gaps is an unusually esoteric inquiry” that involves a mix of 
science and policy issues.27  Moreover, although some questions are posed in terms that 
may appear to be entirely scientific — such as whether a given level of exposure to a 
pollutant is safe, or whether a proposed activity will “jeopardize” an endangered species 
— their resolution inevitably requires the decisionmaker to make policy judgments, 
regardless of the breadth of scientific information available.28 
 
Thus, in many situations in which Congress has required agencies to justify their 
decisions on “scientific” grounds, the existence of scientific uncertainty prevents the 
agency from restricting the factors it considers to those that are exclusively scientific.  
Although an agency’s consideration of available scientific knowledge in these contexts 
may help to “legitimize” its decisions, the agency cannot avoid the need to make value 
judgments and policy determinations in reaching its ultimate conclusion about whether to 
permit a certain activity with potential adverse effects on the environment to proceed and, 
if so, to what extent.29 
 
B. Accommodating Bounded Rationality in Environmental Policy 
Decisions 
 
 Faced with the impossibility of eliminating scientific uncertainty, both Congress 
and the federal agencies responsible for protecting the environment and preserving the 
nation’s natural resource base have taken steps to accommodate bounded rationality, 
while retaining a science-based focus for addressing environmental problems.  Some of 
the federal environmental laws require that agencies base their decisions on the “best 
available science,” thereby recognizing that complete information may never be 
available.  In such situations, the statutes charge the agencies with doing the best they can 
to mine the information that it is practical to obtain before discharging their statutory 
responsibilities.  Some agencies, including the Forest Service, have interpreted statutory 
                                                                                                                                                 
model is essential to understanding the relevance of specific target organ toxicities to what would be 
expected in humans.”  Carl F. Cranor & David A. Eastmond, Scientific Ignorance and Reliable Patterns of 
Evidence in Toxic Tort Causation:  Is There A Need for Liability Reform?, 64-AUT. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
5, 33 (2001). 
27
 Wagner, supra note 20, at 193. 
28
 In deciding whether a given level of exposure to pollution is safe, for example, an agency may have to 
decide whether it is “safe” for humans to experience an excess risk of contracting cancer of one in a million 
or one in 100,000.  The agency will have to make that policy determination even if it has epidemiological 
data upon which it may make an accurate assessment of the risk of exposure. 
29
 Tarlock, supra note 5, at 142-43.  See also RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
224 (2004) (asserting that “[s]cience will not supply the fixed standard for what constitutes the appropriate 
level of ecosystem protection for simple application by environmental lawmakers”); DAVID SCHOENBROD, 
SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON:  HOW CONGRESS GRABS POWER, SHIRKS 
RESPONSIBILITY, AND SHORTCHANGES THE PEOPLE 69 (2005) (contending that the “finely calibrated 
techniques” of science “provide no right answer to many questions of the greatest [environmental] policy 
consequence”). 
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provisions requiring that decisions be based on science as permitting decisionmaking 
based on the best available science. 
 
Agencies also have frequently accommodated bounded rationality by resorting to 
simulation techniques such as modeling and the use of surrogates.  Reliance on modeling 
or surrogates allows the decisionmaker relying on these techniques to extrapolate from 
known information to realms of uncertainty, thereby plugging data gaps that otherwise 
might have prevented the decisionmaker from justifying its decisions in scientific terms. 
 
The remainder of this part describes these techniques for accommodating bounded 
rationality.  Part III analyzes the efforts of the Forest Service to use best available science 
mandates, modeling, and surrogates to carry out its responsibility under the NFMA to 
protect plant and animal diversity in the national forests. 
 
  1. “Best Available Science” Mandates 
 
 Provisions requiring that federal environmental and natural resource management 
agencies base their decisions on consideration of the “best available science” are 
common.  Perhaps the best known of these is the provision of the ESA requiring the 
Interior and Commerce Departments to base their decisions on whether or not to list a 
species as endangered or threatened “solely on the basis of the best scientific and 
commercial data available.”30  But Congress has used the same or similar language in a 
variety of other pollution control and natural resource management statutes.31 
 
 Although Congress has never defined the term “best available science” in any of 
the environmental statutes in which that term is used,32 it has explicitly recognized in 
directing that agencies make decisions on that basis that the optimal amount of scientific 
evidence for making the decision involved may not be available.33  As Holly Doremus 
has explained, a “best available science” mandate may serve multiple purposes.  These 
include ensuring that an agency’s decisions accurately reflect known scientific 
information, imposing a mandate on the agency to make its best efforts to ferret out 
available information,34 placing an imprimatur of objectivity on agency decisions to 
                                                 
30
 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A). 
31
 See Michael J. Brennan et al., Square Pegs and Round Holes:  Application of the “Best Scientific Data 
Available” Standard in the Endangered Species Act, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 387, 402-03 (2003) (citing 
various federal and state laws, including the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 
and the Magnuson-Stevens Act); Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act:  
Why Better Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1033-34 (1997) [cited hereinafter 
as Doremus, Listing Decisions] (listing natural resource management statutes that use variants of the “best 
available science” terminology).  See also A. W. Harris, The Best Scientific Evidence Available:  The 
Whaling Moratorium and Divergent Interpretations of Science, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
375 (2005) (discussing efforts by the International Whaling Commission to limit whaling). 
32
 Doremus, Listing Decisions, supra note 31, at 1033-34.  See also Brennan, supra note 31, at 390 (stating 
that, although Congress placed a “near-talismanic reliance” on the use of the best available science in the 
ESA, it “failed to provide guidance on how to determine whether particular data meets this standard”). 
33
 Doremus, Listing Decisions, supra note 31, at 1075. 
34
 “[T]he ESA's best available science mandate might impose . . . an affirmative obligation to find data, 
rather than to simply evaluate what others present.  A few courts have interpreted the [ESA’s] best 
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increase public trust and enhance the agency’s credibility,35 and creating a basis for 
resolving judicial challenges to agency decisions.36  Ultimately, it is possible for the 
adoption of a statutory or regulatory mandate that an agency base its decisions solely on 
the “best available science” to make it harder for environmental agencies to weaken 
environmental and natural resource protection mechanisms by relying on political 
opposition or on factors, such as economic considerations, that tend to cut against 
stringent pollution control requirements or meaningful constraints on natural resource 
development.37 
 
  2. Modeling and Reliance on Surrogates 
 
 The environmental and natural resource management agencies have sought to 
accommodate bounded rationality in two other, related ways.  First, agencies have 
created models that enable them to predict the impacts of their decisions on the 
environment by simulating real world conditions.  Second, they have focused their 
                                                                                                                                                 
available science mandate to impose precisely such an obligation,” although some have refused to do so.   
Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act’s Best Available Science 
Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 424 (2004) [cited hereinafter as Doremus, Best Available Science Mandate].  
Compliance with a mandate to engage in the agency’s best efforts could involve a change in the ways in 
which the agency accumulates or interprets scientific information, such as engaging in peer review before 
determining whether to credit a particular piece of evidence.  Id. at 432-33. 
35
 Professor Doremus has explained: 
When they first developed the best available science mandate, legislators and regulators alike 
might well have believed that it would increase public acceptance of ESA decisions.  People are 
more likely to accept outcomes that prove unfavorable to their interests when they trust the 
motives of the actor.   The apparent objectivity of science seems ideally suited to enhancing trust.  
It is no surprise, therefore, that politicians have often cloaked decisions made on other grounds in 
the garb of science. 
Id. at 426-27.  In addition, Professor Doremus speculates that a “best available science” mandate may have 
the effect, if not the purpose, of shifting decisionmaking authority within the agency from political 
appointees to scientists, many of whom are likely to be career employees.  If such a shift were to occur, it 
might actually result in a decisionmaking process that relies more heavily on objective assessments of 
scientific evidence and less on raw political determinations. 
36
 A best available science mandate might prompt more deferential substantive review if the courts are 
inclined to defer to an agency’s scientific and technical determinations.  See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983) (enunciating deferential standard of judicial 
review of agency technical determinations).  On the other hand, a “best available science” mandate may 
provide a basis for a court to scrutinize the agency’s explanation to determine whether it has adequate 
support in the record.  See Doremus, Best Available Science Mandate, supra note 34, at 430; Brennan et al., 
supra note 31, at 412 (stating that “many courts applying the best scientific data available standard under 
the ESA have imposed an affirmative obligation on the agency to explain why, when faced with two 
contradictory scientific conclusions, it chooses one over the other”). 
37
 See, e.g., Doremus, Best Available Science Mandate, supra note 34, at 435-36: 
[T]he best available science mandate may be playing a vital role in stiffening agencies' 
conservation backbones.  It prevents the agencies from openly making decisions based on the 
costs of conservation or expected political opposition.  Undoubtedly, expected economic and 
political costs still figure in, but they cannot be openly acknowledged as the basis for a decision.  
Decisions must be scientifically defensible, even if other unacknowledged factors contribute to 
them.  The mere suggestion that a decision expressly considered political or economic factors can 
make judicial reversal more likely. 
See also Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 4, at 22 (arguing that the ESA’s “best available science” mandate 
amounts to “a finger on the scale, of some indeterminate size, on the side of the species”). 
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analysis on a small component of a particular human-nature interaction and used it as a 
surrogate for the larger problem to which they are responding or which they are 
attempting to manage.  The two mechanisms for accommodating bounded rationality are 
interrelated because one of the primary challenges for modelers is to “find reliable 
surrogate variables to permit the [agency] to ‘scale up’ the more finely scaled 
measurements researchers typically collect.”38  Simulation techniques can facilitate 
decisionmaking in the face of scientific uncertainty by allowing agencies to extrapolate 
from observed data to situations in which apparently crucial information is missing.  
Modeling exercises cannot eliminate uncertainty, however, and they create a risk that 
those conducting the modeling exercise can mask value judgments behind a façade of 
technical objectivity. 
 
   a. The Ubiquity of Modeling in Environmental Policymaking 
 
Modeling and other simulation techniques have become important components of 
policymaking in many fields, including environmental law.39  Modeling is an integral part 
of the process of the implementation of pollution control statutes.  The federal Clean Air 
Act (CAA) is perhaps the best example of the wide variety of uses to which modeling 
may be put in efforts by federal and state agencies to minimize risks to public health and 
the environmental resulting from pollution.  Both the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and state agencies have relied on modeling to designate air 
quality control regions under the program for achieving the national ambient air quality 
standards (NAAQS).40  EPA has used models to establish emission limitations for 
individual sources of air pollution in crafting nationally uniform emission standards for 
stationary sources41 and state pollution control agencies have done so in developing state 
implementation plans (SIPs) for achieving the NAAQS.42  Indeed, the CAA requires that 
                                                 
38
 Fred L. Bunnell & Mark Boyland, Decision–Support Systems:  It’s the Question Not the Model, 10 J. FOR 
NATURE CONSERVATION 269, 274 (2003).  Bunnell and Boyland add: 
The advantages gained in assisting management emphasize the importance of developing reliable, 
interim surrogate variables for those portions of the real world amenable for aggregation.  When 
we make decisions we incorporate only a few variables effectively.  Again it is apparent that the 
largest benefit gained from the system is in thinking through the questions, variables, and choices 
carefully. 
Id.  
39
 See, e.g., Antje Kann & John P. Weyant, Approaches for Performing Uncertainty Analysis in Large-
Scale Energy/Economic Policy Models, 5 ENVTL. MODELING AND ASSESSMENT 29, 29 (1999) (asserting 
that, “[w]ith rapid advances in computing power over the last decade, large-scale models have become 
essential to decision making in public policy”). 
40
 See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding, however, that modeling 
exercise was based on erroneous data).  See generally Bruce M. Kramer, Air Quality Modeling:  Judicial, 
Legislative and Administrative Reactions, 5 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 236 (1979). 
41
 See, e.g., Lignite Energy Council v. EPA, 198 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (upholding new source 
performance standards based on extrapolation of one industry’s performance to another industry).  Cf. 42 
U.S.C. § 7412(k)(3)(D) (authorizing the use of modeling in the development of a national strategy for 
controlling emission of hazardous air pollutants in urban areas). 
42
 See, e.g., BCCA Appeal Group v. EPA, 355 F.3d 817 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding EPA's reliance on 
photochemical grid model in approving Texas's demonstration that Houston SIP would achieve attainment 
of ozone NAAQS, despite the model's inability to replicate the city's unique meteorological conditions); 
Pan Am. Grain Mfg. Co. v EPA, 95 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 1996); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 
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certain demonstrations that an SIP will provide for attainment of the NAAQS be based on 
photochemical grid modeling or similar analytical techniques approved by EPA.43  The 
agencies have relied on models to decide whether to issue permits specifying emission 
limitations and to establish the limitations set forth in those permits.44  Models also have 
been used to assist in the implementation of emissions trading programs.45 
 
Modeling is also potentially useful in protecting other resources from the adverse 
effects of pollution.  Modeling can provide a basis for predicting the impact of oil spills 
and hazardous substance releases on groundwater quality.46  Models are used in 
conducting risk assessments to determine the potential carcinogenicity of tested chemical 
substances to extrapolate the dose-response data obtained in high-dose animal tests to the  
levels of likely human exposure, for which there is no data or insufficient data.47 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
660 (6th Cir. 1978); Ohio v. EPA, 784 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1986); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 
572 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1978).  See also Michael S. McMahon & Steven D. Hinkle, Note, State of Ohio v. 
EPA:  Does the Sixth Circuit Have A New Standard for Its Review of the EPA’s Use of Air Quality 
Modeling ?, 18 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 569 (1987). 
43
 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(c)(2)(A).  In Envtl. Def. v. EPA, 369 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2004), the court interpreted the 
statute as requiring only that grid modeling form the “foundation and principal component of the attainment 
demonstration.”  See also Sierra Club v. EPA, 356 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (construing § 7511a(c)(2)(A) 
as allowing EPA to adjust results of photochemical grid modeling to assure consistency with real-world 
observations as a means of demonstrating attainment of ozone NAAQS). 
44
 See, e.g., Sur Contra La Contaminacion v. EPA, 202 F.3d 443 (1st Cir. 2000); Northern Plains Res. 
Council v. EPA, 645 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1981).  See generally James A. Westbrook, Air Dispersion 
Modeling:  Tools to Assess Impacts from Pollution Sources, 13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 546 (Spring 
1999). 
45
 See generally Camille V. Otero-Phillips, What’s in the Forecast?  A Look at the EPA’s Use of Computer 
Models In Emissions Trading, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 187 (1998). 
46
 See generally Michael Sklash et al., Groundwater Models:  Can You Believe What They Are Saying?, 13 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 542 (Spring 1999). 
47
 See, e.g., John S. Applegate & Celia Campbell-Mohn, Risk Assessment:  Science, Law and Policy, 14 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 219, 220 (2000) (explaining that epidemiologists “must rely on animal testing to 
estimate the likelihood that cancer will be induced at a given level of exposure” and that “[t]o predict the 
dose response in humans at low levels of exposure over long periods of time, risk assessors must use 
theoretical models because direct observation is impossible”); Michael Schon, Comment, Susceptible 
Children:  Why the EPA’s New Risk Assessment Guidelines for Children Fail to Protect America’s Future, 
36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 701, 704 (2004) (stating that “risk assessment creates an equation that allows regulators to 
predict what the probable risk of cancer would be when people are exposed to a chemical at a particular 
level or concentration,” that, “[i]n formulating this equation, . . . the EPA makes assumptions and develops 
mathematical models to fill in gaps (or ‘uncertainties’) caused from lack of scientific knowledge,” and that 
risk assessment therefore “blends scientific knowledge with probabilistic assumptions”); Vern R. Walker, 
The Myth of Science as a “Neutral Arbiter” For Triggering Precautions, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 197, 
209-10 (2003) (stating that “[t]oxicologists and exposure modelers often use linear regression models to 
characterize the incremental contributions of multiple hazards (e.g., asbestos exposure and cigarette 
smoking) to the total risk of an adverse effect (e.g., lung cancer)” and that “scientists use a variety of 
mathematical models to characterize the quantitative relationships among multiple variables”); Peter C. 
Wright et al., Twenty-Five Years of Cancer Risk Assessment, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 31, 34 (Spring 
2005) (explaining that “EPA has for many years employed the multistage dose-extrapolation model, which 
generally predicts the highest cancer risk of all the most commonly used models and then increases the 
prediction of risk by estimating the statistical upper bound on the best estimate of the multistage model at 
low doses”); Thomas R. Head, III, PCBs — The Rise and Fall of an Industrial Miracle, 19 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 15, 18 (Spring 2005). 
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The federal agencies responsible for managing publicly owned lands and 
resources also commonly engage in modeling exercises.  The Coastal Zone Management 
Act explicitly authorizes modeling to assess water quality in coastal waters and the Great 
Lakes.48  The Fish and Wildlife Service uses modeling to assist in listing and delisting 
decisions,49 in designating critical habitats, 50 and in allowing incidental takings under the 
ESA and the Marine Mammal Protection Act.51  Land management agencies such as the 
National Park Service also rely on modeling exercises to assist in the development of 
standards to guide decisions on which uses to permit or prohibit.52  These agencies, 
among others, also use modeling in the preparation of environmental assessments and 
environmental impact statements under NEPA.53 
 
   b. The Benefits of Modeling 
 
 A model has been defined as “a tool used to simulate some aspect of the real 
world”54 or as “a simplified representation of some aspect of the real world” that allows 
its user to accomplish a “purposeful reduction of a mass of information to a manageable 
size and shape.”55  Some models or other proxies for reality seek to extrapolate data from 
small-scale phenomena (such as the effects of a timber harvest on a single animal 
species) to predict the effects on a larger whole (such as an ecosystem in which the single 
species lives).  Others use observations on a relatively large scale (such as the observed 
effects of exposing laboratory animals to maximum tolerated doses of toxic chemicals) to 
predict the effects of smaller-scale activity (such as the effects of low-level human 
                                                 
48
 16 U.S.C.A. § 1451(g)(2)(B) (requiring evaluation of “research programs on the causes, characteristics, 
and impacts of hypoxia, including recommendations of how to eliminate significant gaps in hypoxia 
modeling and monitoring data”). 
49
 See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designating the Greater Yellowstone 
Ecosystem Population of Grizzly Bears as a Distinct Population Segment; Removing the Yellowstone 
Distinct Population Segment of Grizzly Bears From the Federal List of Endangered and Threatened 
Wildlife, 70 Fed. Reg. 69,854, 69,859 (Nov. 17, 2005). 
50
 See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for the Bull 
Trout, 70 Fed. Reg. 56,212, 56,237 (Sept. 26, 2005). 
51
 See, e.g., Marine Mammals; Incidental Take During Specified Activities, 68 Fed Reg. 66,744, 66,745 
(Nov. 28, 2003) (discussing model that simulated the effects of oil spills on estimated polar bear survival in 
the Beaufort Sea). 
52
 See, e.g., Clarification of the Term the Day in the Definition of Substantial Restoration , 68 Fed. Reg. 
63,129, 63,130 (Nov. 7, 2003) (discussion of computer modeling for analyzing effects of aircraft operations 
on noise levels within the Grand Canyon). 
53
 See, e.g., Utah Envtl. Cong. V. Richmond, 483 F.3d 1127, 1140 (10th Cir. 2007) (describing the Forest 
Service’s use of two computer models to calculate the amount of expected runoff resulting from timber sale 
project and the effect on stream channels); Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 
2005) (challenge to the Forest Service’s use of the Water and Sediment Yields (WATSED) model for 
assessing cumulative effects of timber harvest projects on in-stream sedimentation); Basin Creek Fuels 
Reduction Project, Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest, Silver Bow, County, MT, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,906, 
17,906 (Apr. 14, 2003) (discussing use of fire simulation models to determine where fuels treatments 
would be the most effective in slowing fire while minimizing the number of acres needing to be treated); 
Phase II Amendment of Black Hills National Forest Land and Resource Management, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,406, 
59,406 (Nov. 28, 2001) (referring to recalculation of allowable timber sale quantity and other forest outputs 
based on Forest Vegetation Simulator (FVS), Habitat Capability (HABCAP), and spatial analysis models). 
54
 Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 903 n.1. 
55
 Id. (quoting EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 8 (1978)). 
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exposure to those chemicals).56  Models serve as “decision support systems” that both 
simplify the physical reality being analyzed and translate observed results into 
predictions that would not be available simply by observing that reality.57  Models can 
increase the analyst’s understanding of the relationships at issue (e.g., between a timber 
sale and its impact on biological diversity) by combining or presenting data in a way that 
provides new insights or extends those relationships beyond the range of observed 
measurement.  If the predictions provided by a model turn out to conform to subsequently 
observed real world developments, the modelers gain confidence in the accuracy of the 
assumptions upon which the model is based concerning the relationships between human 
activities and environmental effects.58 
 
Models are particularly well suited to large-scale planning efforts.  Because they 
are capable of “represent[ing] mathematically complex chemical, physical and social 
relationships,” they allow planners “to make predictions and test assumptions in ways 
that otherwise would not be possible.  Not surprisingly, models have become essential 
and ubiquitous planning tools, our dependence upon them making their abandonment all 
but unthinkable.”59  Two observers recently described the attractiveness of modeling to 
planners in the following terms: 
 
Policymakers often must predict outcomes of complicated processes, and making 
those predictions would be all but impossible without models.  Complex 
environmental systems often involve more variables, data, and interdependent 
feedback processes than people reasonably can organize in their minds, and 
interactions within these systems may create counterintuitive, nonlinear responses 
that are impossible to understand without models.  Models can organize, 
manipulate, and process vast quantities of data and can simulate complex 
multivariable processes, and these capacities allow them to predict the future, 
compare alternative possible futures, test the ramifications of assumptions, and 
contribute to improved understanding of system interactions. These powers are 
invaluable in planning efforts.60 
 
Moreover, modeling is an efficient analytical technique because it reduces the time and 
expense needed to gather information, even when acquiring the relevant data through 
                                                 
56See Rose, supra note 1, at 291 (asserting that policymakers extrapolate both from large to small and vice 
versa, but that “the large-to-small extrapolation . . . is especially common in environmental policy”).  For a 
discussion of the validity of conducting animal tests for carcinogenesis at maximum tolerated doses, see 
GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 722-24. 
57
 Bunnell & Boyland, supra note 35, at 270.  See also Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 912 (“models allow 
scientific knowledge to be codified and standardized”). 
58
 Bunnell & Boyland, supra note 38, at 272-73. 
59
 Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 904. 
60
 Id. at 912-13.  See also Hanna J. Cortner & Dennis L. Schweitzer, Institutional Limits and Legal 
Implications of Quantitative Models in Forest Planning, 13 ENVTL. L. 493, 497 (1983)  (arguing that 
“[q]uantitative analytical procedures are necessary to utilize fully data describing complex situations.  
Computers make the use of sophisticated mathematical models possible.  They provide the mechanism to 
organize and manipulate data, to formulate and project management alternatives into the future, and to 
assess physical and socioeconomic implications.”). 
To be published at 83 Indiana L.J., Issue # 2 
U:\Word\articles\NFMA data gaps ssrn.doc 
glicksman Page 14 7/13/2007 
real-world experiments and observation rather through simulation exercises is both 
possible and ethically appropriate.61 
 
   c. The Limits of Modeling 
 
 Modeling and other simulation techniques (such as the use of surrogate variables 
to represent more complicated relationships between human activities and the resulting 
environmental effects) allow environmental and natural resource management agencies to 
make decisions, despite the presence of scientific uncertainty about some aspects of those 
relationships.  They allow agencies whose statutory mandates compel decisions based on 
science to make decisions even when significant scientific information does not yet exist, 
or at least when that information is not currently available to the agency.  Models do not 
eliminate uncertainty, however, and may even exacerbate it if the models provide a 
distorted representation of the real world.  Nor, despite their façade of objectivity, do 
models eliminate the subjective component of environmental decisionmaking or prevent 
agencies from making value judgments.  Finally, the technical nature of modeling 
exercises may shield the agency’s assumptions and value judgments from public scrutiny, 
thereby precluding meaningful public participation in agency decisionmaking processes. 
 
 Models allow decisionmakers to simulate reality in situations in which direct 
observations of the phenomenon being analyzed are either impossible or impractical.62  
Models, however, are only “placeholders for reality.”63  They are capable neither of 
providing a completely accurate representation of reality nor of eliminating the scientific 
uncertainty that induces the decisionmaker to resort to modeling in the first place.64  
Errors in the design and application of models are common, but may not be easy to 
discover.  The inability of models to provide perfect replications of reality becomes a 
problem if the administrative agencies using the models to make decisions fail either to 
recognize or acknowledge these imperfections.  If they fail to recognize them, they may 
continue to rely on models that provide flawed output.  The result may be that the agency 
                                                 
61
 See Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 913.  The authors state: 
Policymakers rarely can perform real-world experiments; large-scale experiments upon the 
environment are generally prohibitively time-consuming and expensive, and the threat of human 
injury or irreparable environmental harm makes some experimentation ethically suspect at best.  
Models avoid these problems by performing their tasks in controlled settings, without 
experimentation upon the actual environment.  [Although g]athering model input data can require 
extensive effort — indeed, data gathering is often the most expensive and time-consuming task in 
a modeling study. . .  the financial costs of modeling, while often quite large in actual dollar terms, 
can pale in comparison to the costs of other planning methods. 
62
 Cf. Sklash, supra note 46, at 542 (defining a model as “any simulation of a real thing”). 
63
 Thomas O. McGarity & Wendy E. Wagner, Legal Aspects of the Regulatory Use of Environmental 
Modeling, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10751, 10763 (2003). 
64
 See Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 904; id. at 922 (contending that, because “no model can incorporate 
all real data or simulate all of the processes that might influence an outcome” and “every model is 
necessarily an approximation of reality, models' predictions unavoidably contain some error”).  Uncertainty 
in models take two forms:  “parametric uncertainty, which arises due to imperfect knowledge,” and 
“stochasticity, which is due to inherent variability in certain processes.”  Kann & Weyant, supra note 39, at 
30.  Whereas the first kind of uncertainty decreases over time as scientists accumulate additional factual 
knowledge, “stochastic uncertainty is not reduced over time” because “natural variability will always 
occur.”  Id. 
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makes decisions that conflict with governing statutory criteria or with the agency’s own 
stated goals.65  The limitations on data that initially prompted resort to the models may 
hinder the modelers’ ability to assess whether the models are working in the intended 
manner.66  If an agency using simulation techniques is aware of modeling flaws but fails 
to disclose them, not only may the decisions based on the model deviate from statutory 
norms, but affected entities and the public at large may have difficulty discovering the 
deviation. 
 
 Models not only fail to provide complete representations of objective reality.  By 
their very nature, they are also incapable of providing analysis that is entirely objective, 
although they may be perceived in that manner.67  Models are built upon assumptions.  
Those assumptions inevitably reflect value judgments.  These value judgments can affect 
the selection of a model from among several alternatives, the design of the model, and the 
manner in which modeling results are interpreted and communicated.68  If toxicologists 
use models to provide estimates of the risk of getting cancer as a result of long-term, low-
level exposure to cancer-causing substances, for example, they may assume that there is 
no safe level of exposure in the absence of data to the contrary.  Alternatively, they may 
take the position that the absence of data demonstrating a risk at low levels of exposure 
should be interpreted as evidence that a safe threshold level of exposure exists at the 
lowest point on the dose-response curve at which known adverse effects have occurred.  
The choice between these two competing assumptions requires the analyst or 
policymaker to make a judgment call.  The first assumption reflects a decision to err on 
the side of safety, while the second may be based on a desire not to restrict economically 
productive activity that creates potentially carcinogenic exposures in the absence of a 
demonstrable threat to the public health.  Similarly, a model that seeks to compare the 
costs and benefits of implementing an environmental protection measure will have to 
incorporate a discount rate to compute the number (and perhaps the value) of lives saved 
in the future and the costs that will result from alternative levels of regulation.69 
 
The necessity of making value judgments in the design of models or other 
simulation techniques is not problematic, as along as those judgments are disclosed so the 
impacts of those judgments on the modeling results can be assessed.  As two observers of 
the use of modeling by the Forest Service have put it: 
                                                 
65
 See, e.g., Falk Huetmann, Databases and Science-Based Management in the Context of Wildlife and 
Habitat:  Toward a Certified ISO Standard for Objective Decision-Making for the Global Community by 
Using the Internet, 69 J. OF WILDLIFE MGMT. 466, ___ (April 2005) (stating that “[d]ecisions based on soft 
foundations can harm wildlife and habitat and threaten future survival”). 
66
 See Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 924-25. 
67
 See Cortner & Schweitzer, supra note 60, at 516 (contending that “[v]alue-laden considerations permeate 
both the formulation of the model and the application of model results” and that “[q]uantitative models are 
subject to the same qualitative and subjective influences as the beyond-the-model portion of the decision 
process”). 
68
 See Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 927-29. 
69
 See Kann & Weyant, supra note 39, at 30 (referring to policy choices about protecting future generations 
involved in the selection of a discount rate); id. at 29 (stating that different underlying assumptions, such as 
how to value a human life, can lead to widely varying results among different models).  See generally Lisa 
Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, 
Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39 (1999). 
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Values are unavoidable.  The use of quantitative planning models, specifying 
ways of doing things in a reproducible manner and seeking to substitute 
mathematical algorithms for intuitive judgments, appears to make the planning 
process more rational and scientific.  The danger is that the planning agency, the 
courts, and the public may all lose sight of where and how these unavoidable 
values enter quantitative models and the impact they have on the use of analytical 
results.70 
 
Indeed, the value judgments reflected in quantitative models may be les 
problematic than those built into nonquantitative scientific hypotheses based on analogies 
or metaphors, provided the modeler discloses the algorithm upon which the model is 
based.  The underlying assumptions of a mathematical model may be more easily 
examined, assessed for potential bias, and falsified than the less visible assumptions and 
value judgments built into a non-mathematical model.  One criterion for determining 
whether an analytical technique qualifies as “scientific” is whether the theories upon 
which it proceeds are falsifiable.71  To the extent that a quantitative model lends itself 
more readily to falsification, its use fits more comfortably within the framework of 
scientific analysis than an analogical model whose underlying assumptions are hidden. 
 
 According to some who have analyzed science-based decisionmaking by the 
federal land management agencies, the use of modeling by those agencies is susceptible 
to the criticism that the agencies, intentionally or not, have masked their value judgments 
in the language of technical determinations.  As a result, “outsiders are frequently unable 
to discover exactly what [the Forest Service has] done or to determine if bias has crept 
into analysis.  For example, management activities thought to be undesirable might be 
eliminated from consideration without explicit analysis, or constraints judged overly 
restrictive relaxed to give the decisionmaker a greater range of discretion.”72  Decisions 
by the Interior Department’s Fish and Wildlife Service and the Commerce Department’s 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries under the ESA have 
provoked a similar charge: 
 
Rather than achieving either value-neutral or politically invulnerable 
decisionmaking, the strictly science mandate [of § 4 of the ESA] has encouraged 
the listing agencies to devise an inscrutable listing policy hidden behind a wall 
                                                 
70
 Cortner & Scweitzer, supra note 60, at 495-96.  See also Doremus, Constitutive Law, supra note 1, at 
334-35: 
The obsessive search for objective bases for decisions also creates a temptation to disguise non-
objective decisions as scientific, a practice that skews the political process and can interfere with 
our ability to achieve our real goals.  Where science or economics cannot provide the answers that 
policy decisions require, seemingly objective criteria are more likely to hide than to overcome the 
biases of decisionmakers, and are not likely to produce consistent or predictable decisions. 
71
 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (quoting KARL POPPER, 
CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS:  THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989) (“[T]he 
criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability”) (emphasis 
deleted).)” 
72
 Cortner & Schweitzer, supra note 60, at 503. 
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labeled science. The mandate has produced listing decisions which are often 
incomprehensible even to informed observers, and nearly inaccessible to the 
general public.73 
 
d. Judicial Review of Model-Based Decisionmaking by 
Environmental and Natural Resource Management  
Agencies 
 
 Litigants have challenged decisions by environmental agencies based on the use 
of models, surrogates, or other simulation techniques.  In some of these cases, the 
challengers have asserted procedural errors in the agency’s decisionmaking process, 
while in others the litigants have claimed that the decisions were substantively flawed. 
 
In reviewing challenges to the use of agency models, the courts in environmental 
cases have recognized the importance of disclosing and providing an opportunity to 
comment upon the model’s assumptions.74  “In particular, the Agency must provide clear 
notice of the possibility that it will rely upon a particular model and provide sufficient 
information about that model to allow the public to comment upon its use of the model in 
the rulemaking proceeding.”75  In one case, the D.C. Circuit rejected the claim that EPA 
failed to afford adequate notice of its intention to rely on a model in deciding whether to 
list a substance as hazardous air pollutant under the CAA.   It found that EPA had 
explained the basis for the model in the notice of proposed rulemaking, set forth its 
rationale for making various assumptions, requested comments on those assumptions, 
addressed significant comments in documents that accompanied the final rule, and made 
revisions in modeling parameters based upon the comments it received.76  As long as the 
agency follows these steps, the courts are unlikely to invalidate the agency’s model-based 
decision on the ground that it failed to provide proper notice of the model’s role in the 
decisionmaking process.77 
 
                                                 
73
 Doremus, Listing Decisions, supra note 31, at 1129. 
74
 In Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2005), the court held that the Forest Service violated 
NEPA by approving a timber harvest as part of a watershed restoration project.  In particular, the court 
found that the agency’s “heavy reliance” on the WATSED model to analyze the cumulative effects of 
timber harvests on in-stream sedimentation violated NEPA 
because there was inadequate disclosure that the model's consideration of relevant variables is 
incomplete.  Moreover, the Forest Service knew that WATSED had shortcomings, and yet did not 
disclose these shortcomings until the agency's decision was challenged on the administrative 
appeal.  We hold that this withholding of information violated NEPA, which requires up-front 
disclosures of relevant shortcomings in the data or models. 
Id. at 1032. 
75
 McGarity & Wagner, supra note 63, at 10755.  See also Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 911 (stating that 
“[t]he judiciary does acknowledge an obligation to carefully review the procedural integrity of agency 
decision-making” that is based on the use of models). 
76
 Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
77
 See McGarity & Wagner, supra note 63, at 10756 (stating that “an EPA modeling exercise conducted in 
the context of notice-and-comment rulemaking should not suffer reversal on notice grounds if the Agency 
is careful to describe the model in some detail; identify the assumptions upon which the model relies; 
explain why those assumptions are valid in the particular context in which it is applying the model; and 
specifically request comments on the validity of the assumptions and their use in the modeling exercise”).   
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Substantive challenges to an agency’s use of modeling in environmental 
decisionmaking typically face an uphill battle.  The courts have been wary of second-
guessing the manner in which the environmental agencies have interpreted and applied 
science.78  They also have recognized that, in many environmental decisionmaking 
contexts, the use of modeling is essential to the ability of the agency to implement its 
statutory responsibilities.79  As a result, judicial review of agency modeling decisions has 
tended to be very deferential.80  The courts typically have not been impressed by claims 
that an agency chose the wrong model from among competing alternative models,81 that 
deficiencies in the data the agency plugged into the model invalidated the results,82 that 
the model did not accurately predict or was not capable of actually predicting real world 
results,83 or that the agency should have deferred its decision until it could accumulate 
more information instead of relying on modeling results.84 
                                                 
78
 See, e.g., id. at 10757 (claiming that “[t]he general rule for the courts' substantive review of technical 
models under the informal rulemaking provisions of the APA is deference to the agency's technical and 
policy choices as long as the agency explains its choices, especially the controverted ones, in an accessible 
and complete way”); Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 911-12 (asserting that “[r]espect for agencies’ 
interpretations of science . . . [has] become deeply institutionalized within the judiciary” and that 
“[d]eference to agency judgment is a core element of judicial review of environmental decisions, and 
judicial opinions are filled with statements about how agencies, not judges, hold technical expertise”). 
79
 See Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 915 (quoting Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 332 (D.C. Cir. 
1981)) (stating that, “[r]ealistically, computer modeling is a useful and often essential tool for performing 
the Herculean labors Congress imposed on EPA in the Clean Air Act”).  One court assessed the utility of 
groundwater flow modeling as a technique for helping to allocate the costs of responding to groundwater 
contamination among multiple responsible parties as follows: 
If properly used, computer models appear to be an invaluable tool in approximating the 
complexities of underground fluid flow.  Without these models, the scientists and engineers would 
be limited to guessing at sources and fluid flow characteristics based on the limited number of 
wells that penetrate the aquifer.  Through modeling, reservoir flow and contaminant transport can 
be calculated using complex mathematical operations that simulate the aquifer characteristics. 
From that effort, the model can simulate the progression of contaminant plumes from each source, 
thereby providing an estimate of the size of each plume at any given time.  Unfortunately, there 
are no true crystal balls − the models are only as good as the data placed into them.  In this case, 
the data inputs and methods for configuring the models provided fertile ground for disagreement. 
Nonetheless, the court concludes that computer modeling of plume size is an appropriate basis for 
allocating costs. 
City of Wichita v. Tr. of the Apco Liquidating Trust, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1106-07 (D. Kan. 2003). 
80
 Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 4, at 19 (stating that “[s]cientific judgments are generally set aside only 
in the most egregious situations, as when it is clear that there is a major inconsistency between the 
underlying information and the ultimate conclusion”). 
81
 See, e.g., Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1978). 
82
 See McGarity & Wagner, supra note 63, at 10765. 
83
 See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
EPA, 578 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1978); Oceana, Inc. v. Evans, 384 F. Supp. 2d 203, 221 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding 
that model used to assess impact of scallop fishing on turtles bore a reasonable relationship to the reality it 
purported to represent, despite uncertainties in its application), appeal dismissed sub nom. Oceana, Inc. v. 
Gutierrez, 179 Fed. Appx. 703 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  But cf. Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 
1268 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating, in the course of holding that EPA violated the Energy Policy Act by 
choosing a 10,000-year compliance period for its radiation-exposure standards, “that there is still 
considerable uncertainty as to whether current modeling capability allows development of computer 
models that will provide sufficiently meaningful and reliable projections over a time frame up to tens-of-
thousands to hundreds-of-thousands of years,” and that “[s]imply because such models can provide 
projections for those time periods does not mean those projections are meaningful and reliable enough to 
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A case that illustrates the judicial inclination toward deference to agency 
modeling choices involved an Indian tribe’s challenge to the Corps of Engineers’ 
decision to implement a flood control program in the Florida Everglades that entailed the 
construction of structures such as pump stations and seepage reservoirs.  The tribe 
focused on the Corps’s failure to provide information to the FWS based on computer 
modeling about the effect of the construction on endangered birds before the latter issued 
its biological opinion on the program.  According to the tribe, this failure violated the 
ESA’s mandate that agencies use “the best scientific and commercial data available to 
ensure the protection” of listed species.85  The court refused to find that the Corps 
violated the ESA, concluding that it was appropriate to defer to the Corps’s decision “to 
proceed with imperfect information.”86  The Corps did not act in an arbitrary and 
capricious fashion by relying on limited modeling information, particularly because it 
feared that awaiting the results of further modeling would allow additional damage to the 
birds’ habitat to occur.87 
 
The courts have invalidated agency decisions that relied on modeling or 
simulation exercises, however, in cases in which they have found that a particular model 
was ill-suited to the activities to which it was applied88 or that the agency was unable to 
justify building the model on apparently arbitrary assumptions.89  Another ESA case 
provides a natural resources law example of the willingness of the courts to reverse an 
agency’s reliance on modeling or simulation techniques on these grounds.  The ESA 
allows the FWS to issue an incidental take statement (ITS)90 that allows federal agencies 
to engage in activities that otherwise would have violated the ESA’s prohibition on the 
taking of endangered species.91  When the FWS decides to issue an ITS, it must specify 
                                                                                                                                                 
establish a rational basis for regulatory decisionmaking”); Ohio v. EPA, 638 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1980) 
(concluding that EPA’s reliance on air quality model was arbitrary in the absence of any effort to test the 
model’s results against actual monitoring data). 
84
 See McGarity & Wagner, supra note 63, at 10765. 
85
 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
86
 Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2006). 
87
 Id. 
88
 See, e.g., Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C Cir. 2000) (invalidating EPA decision 
to establish zero-level maximum contaminant level goal under the Safe Drinking Water Act for chemical 
based on application of linear, no-threshold model of carcinogenesis, despite existence of evidence that 
there was a safe threshold level of exposure); Columbia Falls Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 139 F.3d 914, 922 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (invalidating treatment standard for hazardous waste established by EPA under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act because the assumptions on which a test for determining whether 
a waste is hazardous was based did not fit the situation to which EPA applied it; the court stated flatly that, 
as EPA admitted, “the model does not work”); Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 2 F.3d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(concluding that EPA failed to demonstrate a rational relationship between test used to measure toxicity 
and the mineral processing wastes to which it was applied). 
89
 See, e.g., Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that EPA 
improperly listed a pollutant as a high-risk, hazardous air pollutant based on the use of a generic air 
dispersion model that included assumptions that EPA conceded were not accurate for that particular 
pollutant).  See generally McGarity & Wagner, supra note 63, at 10759-61; Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 
915-16. 
90
 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4). 
91
 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). 
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in the ITS, among other things, the amount of the incidental taking that is permitted.92  
Although the courts have indicated that, ideally, that amount should take the form of a 
specific number, they have allowed the FWS to substitute a “meaningful surrogate” for 
the amount of the permissible incidental take if identification of a specific number is not 
practical.93  In one case, the court held that the FWS violated the ESA by using ecological 
conditions as a surrogate for the amount of the permissible incidental take because it 
failed to establish a link between the conditions chosen by the FWS in the ITS and the 
extent of the incidental taking that would be caused by the Bureau of Land 
Management’s authorization of off-road vehicle use within the habitat of the listed 
species.94 
 
 C. Summary 
 
 The federal statutes that delegate authority to administrative agencies to protect 
the environment from pollution or manage publicly owned land and resources require that 
the agencies base many of their decisions on scientific determinations, and sometimes 
require decisions to be based exclusively on scientific grounds.  These mandates create 
difficulties for the agencies when, as is often the case, the relevant scientific knowledge is 
incomplete.  Statutes that permit agencies to premise their decisions on the best available 
science recognize that demanding that decisions be based on scientific certainty is a 
chimerical objective in many environmental policy contexts.  These statutes address the 
reality of bounded rationality by requiring that agency decisions conform to the known 
evidence and to reasonable extrapolations from that evidence.  Best available science 
mandates have the capacity to enhance public trust in agency decisions and provide a 
standard for judicial review of those decisions. 
 
 The environmental and natural resource management agencies have reacted to 
bounded rationality by adopting a variety of models and related techniques that permit 
them to simulate the unknown effects of human activities subject to the agencies’ 
jurisdiction based on organization and manipulation of a relatively small and manageable 
body of available information.  These proxy regimes, like mandates that agencies act on 
the basis of the best available evidence, may counter the tendency to defer making 
decisions on important issues until agencies believe that they have mastered all aspects of 
the particular problem being addressed. 
 
Models and the use of other simulation techniques such as reliance on surrogates, 
however, are incapable of eliminating bounded rationality, and may even exacerbate 
preexisting uncertainty if they are built upon flawed input or if their output is improperly 
interpreted or applied.  By mandating that agencies act on the basis of the best available 
scientific evidence, and by endorsing (explicitly or implicitly) the use of models, 
                                                 
92
 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a)(1)(i). 
93
 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1137-38 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(citing Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229, 1249, 1250 (9th Cir. 
2001)). 
94
 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 1138.  See also Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 2001) (reaching a similar result in the context of 
an ITS for livestock management that would result in the incidental taking of the desert tortoise). 
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Congress, in a variety of pollution control and natural resource management contexts, has 
decided that the risks of doing nothing pending elimination of scientific uncertainty 
outweigh the risks of erroneous action in the face of uncertainty. 
 
The use of best available science mandates and modeling to address bounded 
rationality has the potential to subvert the legislative agenda, however, if agencies abuse 
their statutory discretion to proceed in the face of uncertainty by failing to disclose the 
inevitable value judgments they must make when they engage in analytical efforts such 
as modeling or by disguising such judgments in objective terminology.  Some of the 
decision in which the courts invalidated decisions that stemmed from the application of 
models may provide examples of such failures. 
 
The next part of this article explores how the Forest Service has reacted to 
bounded rationality in its attempts to comply with its obligation under the NFMA to 
protect the biological diversity of the national forests.  The final part provides suggestions 
for how to structure the Forest Service’s efforts to promote diversity using techniques 
such as modeling and decisions based on the best available evidence so that the risk of 
unaccountable decisionmaking and subversion of statutory goals is minimized. 
 
III. RELIANCE ON MODELING AND THE USE OF SURROGATES TO PROTECT 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS 
 
The NFMA creates a planning process that requires the Forest Service, among 
other things, to provide for the diversity of plant and animal communities in the national 
forests.95  Part A below briefly describes the NFMA planning process as well as the 
diversity protection component of that process.  Part B explores several contexts in which 
the Forest Service has used modeling to implement the NFMA’s planning provisions.  
Part C explores in greater detail the approaches to implementation of the diversity 
mandate reflected in the agency’s 1982, 2000, and 2005 land use planning regulations.  In 
particular, it describes the agency’s adoption of an approach to diversity protection that 
relied on the identification and protection of management indicator species and the 
subsequent abandonment of that approach and its replacement by a much vaguer, self-
imposed “best available science” mandate.  The discussion seeks to assess whether the 
Forest Service has succeeded in crafting an approach to decisionmaking in the face of 
scientific uncertainty that achieves the benefits of modeling and the use of surrogates 
while avoiding some of the pitfalls described above. 
 
A. The National Forest Management Act’s Planning Process and the 
Diversity Provision 
 
 Although the Forest Service engaged in planning efforts before the adoption of 
the NFMA in 1976, that statute created a more detailed, congressionally directed 
planning regime than had previously existed.96  Spurred in part by excessive use of 
                                                 
95
 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B). 
96
 Congress had previously directed the Forest Service to promulgate long-range, systemwide plans in the 
Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974.  2 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & 
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clearcutting practices, the NFMA planning provisions require the Forest Service to 
prepare an assessment every ten years that describes the renewable resources in all of the 
national forests,97 a program every five years that includes planning objectives over a 
forty-year period for all Forest Service activities,98 and an annual report evaluating actual 
activities in the national forests in relation to the program planning objectives.99 
 
 Of more direct relevance to this article are the provisions governing the planning 
process for individual units of the NFS.  The NFMA mandates that the Forest Service 
develop, maintain, and revise as appropriate LRMPs for each unit of the NFS, using a 
“systematic interdisciplinary approach to achieve integrated consideration of physical, 
biological, economic, and other sciences.”100  The planning process for individual units of 
the NFS entails three steps:  the Forest Service’s promulgation of planning regulations,101 
the adoption of land use plans for individual units that comport with the regulations,102 
and the authorization of management actions (such as timber sales, grazing permits, or 
special use permits for recreational uses) in conformity with the applicable plan.103 
 
The NFMA specifies that the Forest Service’s planning regulations include 
guidelines for insuring “consideration of the economic and environmental aspects of  
various systems of renewable resource management” in protecting forest resources.104  
The statute also requires that plans achieve the goals set forth in the five-year programs 
by “provid[ing] for diversity of plant and animal communities based on the suitability 
and capability of the specific land area in order to meet overall multiple-use 
objectives.”105  The NFMA directs that, in promoting the substantive purposes of the 
NFMA planning requirements, including the provision of plant and animal diversity, the 
Forest Service appoint a committee of scientists to “provide scientific and technical 
advice and counsel on proposed guidelines and procedures to assure that an effective 
interdisciplinary approach is proposed and adopted.”106 
 
The NFMA neither defines the term “diversity of plant and animal communities” 
nor provides any yardstick for determining whether it exists.107  The absence of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
ROBERT  L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 10F:29 (1990, updated periodically).  The 
most comprehensive discussion of the NFMA’s planning requirements for the national forests is Charles F. 
Wilkinson & H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in the National Forests, 64 OR. L. REV. 1 
(1985-86).  See also Michael J. Gippert & Vincent L. DeWitte, The Nature of Land and Resource 
Management Planning Under the National Forest Management Act, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 149 (1996). 
97
 16 U.S.C. § 1601(a). 
98
 16 U.S.C. § 1602. 
99
 16 U.S.C. § 1606(c).  For additional description of all aspects of the NFMA planning process, see 2 
COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 96, at §§ 10F:31-10F:51. 
100
 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a)-(b). 
101
 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g). 
102
 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e). 
103
 The NFMA provides that “[r]esource plans and permits, contracts, and other instruments for the use and 
occupancy of [NFS] lands shall be consistent with the land management plans.”  16 U.S.C. § 1604(i). 
104
 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(A). 
105
 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B). 
106
 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h)(1). 
107
 For a discussion of the justifications for preserving biological diversity, see Holly Doremus, Comment, 
Patching the Ark:  Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265 (1991).  On 
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definition may reflect Congress’s recognition of its lack of technical expertise and its 
recognition that scientific understanding of the concept would evolve over time.108  
Although the absence of a definition of diversity reflects a decision to afford the Forest 
Service considerable discretion in pursuing the diversity mandate, the procedural 
requirements that govern the planning process and the requirement that the agency seek 
input from a Committee of Scientists it is required to appoint were to serve as constraints 
on that discretion.109  The Forest Service in fact shaped its initial planning regulations, 
adopted in 1982, to conform to the recommendations of the Committee.  Among other 
things, the Committee urged the Forest Service to adapt its approach to the preservation 
of diversity to conform to advances in scientific understanding.110  One way to read the 
statutory mandate to provide diversity is that it endorses ecosystem-based 
management.111   
 
 B. Modeling and the National Forest Management Act 
 
  1. The Demand for Forest Service Modeling 
 
 The need for the Forest Service to engage in modeling exercises to implement its 
planning responsibilities under the NFMA stems from bounded rationality.  As two 
observers described the situation just a year after the adoption of the Service’s 1982 
NFMA planning regulations, “[t]he data required to satisfy [the NFMA’s] legal 
requirements [for planning] are far beyond those ever compiled by the Forest Service or 
anyone else. The Forest Service, therefore, relies on judgment to fill gaps in empirical 
knowledge and on quantitative, computerized, systematic, and standardized analytical 
procedures.”112  Similarly, a more recent analysis posits that: 
 
The complexity of forest ecosystems allows scientists to possess detailed 
knowledge of ecosystem processes for only a few locations where case studies 
have been done.  Thus, managers are often faced with making decisions that 
affect an entire landscape with only rudimentary information on ecosystem 
parameters for the vast majority of the area involved.  Models that simulate forest 
                                                                                                                                                 
the many possible meanings of biodiversity, see Fred Bosselman, A Dozen Biodiversity Puzzles, 12 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 364 (2004). 
108
 See Greg D. Corbin, Comment, The United States Forest Service’s Response to Biodiversity Science, 29 
ENVTL. L. 377, 380 (1999). 
109
 Id. at 380-81. 
110
 Id. at 381.  For a description of the role of the Committee of Scientists in the promulgation of NFMA 
planning regulations, see Brian Scott Pasko, Comment, The Great Experiment that Failed?  Evaluating the 
Role of A “Committee of Scientists” as A Tool for Managing and Protecting Our Public Lands, 32 ENVTL. 
L. 509 (2002). 
111
 See Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line:  Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 293, 309-10 (1994) (arguing that the diversity provision “incorporates conservation biology 
considerations into the national forest planning and management process”). 
112
 Cortner & Schweitzer, supra note 60, at 497.  See also id. at 502 (asserting that NFMA planning 
requirements “exceed the current state of knowledge about critical variables and their relationships.  The 
scientifically validated, empirical knowledge base underlying forest planning is typically, rather than 
exceptionally, inadequate.”). 
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succession under various conditions that may be of interest to managers often 
require a higher level of detail.113 
 
The process of compiling and analyzing the information necessary to conduct the kind of 
planning envisioned by the NFMA has prompted the agency to rely on the use of 
“quantitative, computerized, systematic, and standardized procedures.  The quantitative 
models the Forest Service has developed to meet the analytical requirements that flow 
directly from the complexity of planning laws and regulations have become a central 
feature of the current planning process in the United States.”114  By one account, an 
inventory of simulation models available in 1993 for forest planning and ecosystem 
management identified 250 different software tools.115 
 
 The Forest Service’s reliance on modeling programs did not convert the planning 
process into a purely technocratic exercise, devoid of discretion and divorced from the 
need to exercise judgment.  As explained above, efforts to address bounded rationality 
through modeling and similar regimes cannot eliminate the need to exercise judgment or 
the need to make value judgments in selecting a particular model for a particular 
analytical purpose, deciding what information to feed into the model, and interpreting the 
results provided by the model.116  Moreover, land use planning generally and Forest 
Service planning in particular involves a mix of technical expertise and value 
judgments.117  According to one observer, despite “strenuous efforts to quantify 
important ecological processes to support a body of theory in simulation model form, by 
far the larger body of what we know can only be expressed qualitatively, comparatively, 
and inexactly.”118   
 
  2. The Forest Service’s Experience with Modeling 
 
 The Forest Service has long relied heavily on computer modeling in fulfilling its 
planning responsibilities under the NFMA.119  For years, the Forest Service used a 
computer program called FORPLAN (Forest Planning) in its planning efforts.  
FORPLAN projected the possible production of goods and services from a NFS unit 
under different management options.  The agency entered a resource inventory into the 
computer and used the program to calculate the forest’s “benchmark” capacity to produce 
goods and services under options that included maximum commodity production, 
maximum amenity value, and maximum present net market value.  FORPLAN then 
                                                 
113
 Tester et al., Modeling for Ecosystem Management in Minnesota Pine Forests, 80 BIOLOGICAL 
CONSERVATION 313, 313 (1997). 
114
 Cortner & Schweitzer, supra note 60, at 515-16. 
115
 H. Michael Rauscher, Ecosystem Management Decision Support for Federal Forests in the United 
States:  A Review, 114 FOREST ECOL. & MGMT. 173, 184 (1999). 
116
 See supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text. 
117
 Cf. Cortner & Schweitzer, supra note 60, at 499 (asserting that “planning is fundamentally a political 
process that defines winners and losers rather than simply a technical enterprise to define truth”). 
118
 Rauscher, supra note 115, at 184. 
119
 See, e.g., Land and Resource Management Planning, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,807, 26,816 (1988) (referring to 
“[v]arious analytical models such as FORPLAN, IMPLAN, simulation models, fire analysis models, 
transportation analysis models, cost-benefit tools, and fish and wildlife habitat capability models [that] may 
have been used during the planning process”). 
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selected the management course that represented the greatest net public benefit.120  The 
Forest Service eventually abandoned the use of the FORPLAN program when it 
determined that it had become obsolete.121 
 
 For the most part, challenges to the Forest Service’s use of FORPLAN to comply 
with its land use planning obligations met a hostile judicial reception.  In an early attack 
on a NFMA land use plan, a district court described FORPLAN as “a widely recognized 
and respected planning tool generally accepted by the planning community.”122  The 
Ninth Circuit rejected claims that the NFMA did not permit the Forest Service to base its 
comparison of various management alternatives for grazing levels on FORPLAN analysis 
derived from the use of management estimates as inputs into the computer program.  
Holding that the agency did not act improperly, the court stated that “[i]t is enough that 
there is evidence in the record that the grazing output levels were derived by professional 
estimation and were not arbitrarily selected.”123  The same court later refused to overturn 
a computer-generated conclusion that wilderness designation was inappropriate.  The 
court declared that it was not “in a position to prefer [the environmental group plaintiff’s] 
view of the [Forest Service’s] software over the [Forest Service’s] explanation.  [The 
plaintiff] may well disagree with the substantive decisions informing the program design. 
Nevertheless, it has given us no reason to doubt the Forest Service’s position.”124  Still 
later, the Ninth Circuit, in rejecting the claim that a LRMP improperly authorized 
grazing, disagreed with the contention that the Forest Service had improperly fed 
“predetermined” grazing outcomes into its FORPLAN computer program.  The court 
characterized the attack as one based on a misapprehension of the function of FORPLAN. 
 
At least at this stage of its development, FORPLAN is not an artificial life form.  
It is, purely and simply, an analytic modeling tool.  It provides, among other 
things, an analysis of the economic consequences of various planning 
assumptions.  Plaintiffs complain that some of these assumptions included 
grazing.  However, examination of alternatives is precisely what is required of the 
Forest Service.125 
 
                                                 
120
 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 96, at § 10F:37 (quoting Constance Brooks, Multiple Use Versus 
Dominant Use:  Can Federal Land Use Planning Fulfill the Principles of Multiple Use for Mineral 
Development?, 33 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 1-1, 1-20 to 1-23 (1988)). 
121
 Land and Resource Management Planning, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,370, 58,370 (1996) (describing amendment 
to Forest Service directives that “removed requirements that have become obsolete — such as mandating 
the use of FORPLAN, now an outdated computer model”). 
122
 Griffin v. Yeutter, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20400 (S.D. Cal. 1990).  On appeal, the 9th Circuit 
held that the Forest Service violated neither its own NFMA regulations nor NEPA in relying on FORPLAN 
during the planning process.  The court labeled the attacks as challenges to the agency’s “choice of 
methodology,” and concluded that reliance on FORPLAN did not preclude consideration of a reasonable 
range of alternatives.  Griffin v. Yeutter, 944 F.2d 908 (Table), 1991 WL 178134, at *3 (9th Cir. 1991). 
123
 Nevada Land Action Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 717 (9th Cir. 1993). 
124
 Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992). 
125
 Wilderness Soc’y v. Thomas, 188 F.3d 1130, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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Ultimately, the court held that the Forest Service was “plainly entitled to identify 
‘parameters and criteria” in generating alternatives for final consideration, and that the 
agency did not violate the NFMA in using FORPLAN to assist its analysis.126 
 
The Ninth Circuit was not the only inhospitable forum for attacks on the Forest 
Service’s use of FORPLAN.  In another case, an environmental group challenged a 
LRMP by charging that the Forest Service relied on inappropriate assumptions regarding 
the recreation values of timbering that provided input into the FORPLAN model.  The 
Forest Service’s overestimate of the benefits of timbering to recreation allegedly caused 
the program to assume that timber harvesting was necessary for recreation.  The district 
court found nothing in the record to support the claim that the input was unreasonable 
and rejected the challenge.127  
 
An attack on the Forest Service’s use of the FORPLAN model to perform its 
planning functions succeeded in one case, in which the court agreed with an 
environmental group’s argument that the timber price assumptions that FORPLAN 
incorporated were biased and obsolete.  The agency violated its own regulations by using 
ten-year old information instead of current inventory data based on the “best available 
data.”128  Because the agency was unable to show that use of the erroneous data did not 
appreciably affect planning results, the court rejected that portion of the plan,129 although 
it rejected challenges to other aspects of FORPLAN’s application.130 
 
The courts were therefore very deferential to the manner in which the Forest 
Service used the FORPLAN model to assist in its NFMA planning functions.  In the only 
reported case in which a court accepted a FORPLAN-based attack, the court found that 
the Forest Service violated its own regulations in providing input for the computer 
analysis.  Absent that kind of demonstrable mistake, litigants could not convince the 
courts to closely scrutinize the analysis generated by FORPLAN or the manner in which 
it affected the Forest Service’s planning decisions. 
 
The few efforts by litigants to challenge Forest Service planning decisions based 
on the use of other computer models in contexts other than those involving alleged 
noncompliance with the NFMA’s diversity mandate tended to be similarly unsuccessful.  
In one case, for example, a group of recreation outfitters criticized a travel zone model 
                                                 
126
 Id. at 1136. 
127
 Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. 485, 500 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 105 F.3d 
248 (6th Cir. 1997), vacated sub nom. Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998).  
128
 Citizens for Envtl. Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 970, 993 (D. Colo. 1989) (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 
219.12). 
129
 Id.  Cf. Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 116 F.3d 1482 (Table), 1997 WL 295308 (7th Cir. 1997).  In 
that case, the court accepted a challenge to a LRMP based on the contention that the Forest Service used 
outdated data in running a computer program known as HEP (Habitat Evaluation Program) that was 
designed to predict how the plan would affect population levels of animal species.  Although the court 
found that the agency had adequately defended the use of the HEP computer program, it also concluded 
that the agency did not respond sufficiently to the charge that the data fed into the program were flawed.  
“As the plaintiffs point out, a computer program is only as reliable as its input; thus, they argue that if you 
put garbage in, you get garbage out.”  Id. at *13. 
130
 Citizens for Envtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at 991. 
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that the Forest Service used to project travel patterns in a wilderness area.  In rejecting 
the attack, the court noted that the model “was developed over nearly two decades and 
includes extensive studies based on travel diaries, as well as expert opinion and a 
computer model. The Outfitter Plaintiffs’ challenge to these evaluation techniques is not 
well taken. The law is clear that a court may not ‘second-guess methodological choices 
made by an agency in its area of expertise.’”131 
 
  3. Modeling to Protect Biological Diversity 
 
   a. Modeling Choices 
 
 In seeking to protect wildlife from human activities, government and private 
planners have used two different simulation approaches.  The first is population viability 
analysis (PVA), which involves the incorporation of information on habitat quality into 
models used to predict wildlife population viability.  The second seeks to simulate the 
effects of various human activities (such as management actions approved by government 
agencies) on the landscapes in which wildlife is found.132  PVA analysis is based on a 
species census and an evaluation of the direct impact of the activities being contemplated 
on population numbers.  A habitat-based model uses habitat loss as a proxy for the impact 
of the actions being considered on species viability.133  Both approaches rely on 
assumptions about the manner in which humans and wildlife interact, and both produce 
projections of future conditions that are of uncertain accuracy.134  The Forest Service has 
employed both in its efforts to protect plant and animal diversity through the adoption of 
land use plans and the implementation of site-specific management actions that are 
consistent with those plans. 
 
   b. The 1982 Planning Regulations 
 
 The Forest Service adopted its initial NFMA planning regulations in 1979, after 
extensive consultation with the Committee of Scientists.135  Three years later, the Forest 
Service amended the 1979 regulations136 “to streamline the land management planning 
                                                 
131
 County of St. Louis v. Thomas, 967 F. Supp. 370, 375 (D. Minn. 1997) (quoting Inland Empire Pub. 
Lands Council v. Schultz, 992 F.2d 977, 981 (9th Cir.1993)).  Attacks on the use of Forest Service 
computer models have also arisen in the context of the Forest Service’s alleged noncompliance with NEPA.  
See, e.g., Cortner & Schweitzer, supra note 57, at 502 (describing successful challenge to computer scoring 
system used by the Forest Service to support its wilderness recommendations because the model failed to 
supply the kind of site-specific analysis required by NEPA). 
132
 Michael A. Larson et al., Linking Population Viability, Habitat Suitability, and Landscape Simulation 
Models for Conservation Planning, 180 ECOLOGICAL MODELING 103, 104 (2004).  The authors assert that 
“[m]ethods for habitat modeling based on landscape simulations and PVA modeling based on habitat 
quality are well developed, but no published study of which we are aware has effectively joined them in a 
single, comprehensive analysis.”  Id. at 104. 
133
 Brennan, supra note 31, at 432. 
134
 Larson et al., supra note 132, at 114-15. 
135
 44 Fed. Reg. 53,928 (1979).  The Secretary of Agriculture selected the Committee, which was 
comprised of experts from outside the Forest Service, with the assistance of the National Academy of 
Sciences.  Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 96, at 12 (listing the members of the Committee). 
136
 47 Fed. Reg. 43,026 (1982). 
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process,”137 again after consulting with the Committee of Scientists.  At the time the 
Forest Service adopted the 1982 regulations, scientific understanding of biodiversity was 
rudimentary.  The prevailing view among scientists at the time apparently was that the 
number of species in an area provides an accurate representation of the area’s 
biodiversity.138  The 1982 planning regulations required the agency to assess the impact 
of management actions on management indicator species because the Forest Service 
believed that population changes in these MIS provided a gauge on the impacts of 
management actions on other species as well.139 
 
 The 1982 planning regulations required that each land use plan include 
monitoring and evaluation requirements that would provide a basis for a periodic 
determination of the effects of management practices.140  The regulations also directed 
planners to manage fish and wildlife habitat to maintain “viable populations” of existing 
native and desired non-native vertebrate species.  The regulations defined a “viable 
population” for these purposes as “one which has the estimated numbers and distribution 
of reproductive individuals to insure its continued existence is well distributed in the 
planning area.”141  To insure the maintenance of viable populations, the regulations 
required that land use plans provide sufficient habitat “to support, at least, a minimum 
number of reproductive individuals” and that the habitat be well distributed to permit 
those individuals to interact with others in the planning area.142 
 
 The 1982 regulations required that vertebrate and invertebrate species in the 
planning area be “identified and selected as management indicator species” as a means of 
estimating the effects of alternative management actions on fish and wildlife 
populations.143  The plan documents also had to explain the reasons for selecting those 
MIS.  The regulations directed planning officials to select MIS “because their population 
changes are believed to indicate the effects of management activities.”144  MIS were 
supposed to include representatives, where appropriate, of plant and animal species listed 
by federal or state agencies as endangered or threatened, species with special habitat 
needs that might be significantly influenced by management programs, species 
commonly hunted or fished, non-game species of special interest, and any additional 
plant or animal species “selected because their population changes are believed to 
indicate the effects of management activities on other species of selected major biological 
                                                 
137
 47 Fed. Reg. 7678 (1982) (proposed rule). 
138
 See Corbin, supra note 108, at 392.  Corbin adds that, more recently: 
scientists [have] recognize[d] that biodiversity is far more than the simple sum total of species 
found within an arbitrarily defined geographic locale.  For instance, biodiversity is currently seen 
within a hierarchical paradigm encompassing levels of biological organization from genes to 
ecosystems.   In addition, each level of the hierarchy comprises compositional, structural, and 
functional elements. 
Id. 
139
 Anna M. Seidman & Douglas S. Burdin, Forest Wildlife Management:  A Legal Battleground for a 
Scientific Dilemma, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 40, 41 (Fall 2005). 
140
 36 C.F.R. § 219.11(d) (2000). 
141
 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (2000). 
142
 Id. 
143
 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(1) (2000). 
144
 Id. 
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communities or on water quality.”145  The regulations specified that, “[o]n the basis of 
available scientific information,” planners were to “estimate the effects of changes in 
vegetation type, timber age classes, community composition, rotation age, and year-long 
suitability of habitat related to mobility of management indicator species.  Where 
appropriate, measures to mitigate adverse effects shall be prescribed.”146 
 
 Finally, the regulations parroted but amplified the NFMA’s diversity mandate.  
They required that 
 
forest planning provide for diversity of plant and animal communities and tree 
species consistent with the overall multiple-use objectives of the planning area.  
Such diversity shall be considered throughout the planning process.  Inventories 
shall include quantitative data making possible the evaluation of diversity in terms 
of its prior and present condition.  For each planning alternative, the 
interdisciplinary team shall consider how diversity will be affected by various 
mixes of resource outputs and uses, including proposed management practices.147 
 
 The MIS approach to protecting biodiversity proceeds on the premise “that a 
single species can act as a bellwether for environmental change.  According to this 
concept, the species is so closely tied to its environment that fluctuations in its population 
directly reflect environmental changes that impact other species as well.”148  The 
approach was attractive to those engaged in forest planning because it avoided the need to 
engage in the much more burdensome task of monitoring and managing for all species 
found in a particular ecosystem.149  It was a relatively sophisticated method of simulating 
the effects of management actions on diversity in that it allowed modelers to consider a 
variety of factors, including: 
 
genetics, demographics, habitat needs, spatial distribution, inter-and intra-
population dynamics, and environmental influences on the continued existence of 
a population.   With such a broad scope of relevant factors, PVA is capable of 
incorporating many levels of the biodiversity hierarchy.  Even more powerful is 
its ability to link those factors to population extinction probabilities.  Once the 
critical factors in a population's survival are hypothesized, land managers can 
estimate how many reproductive individuals are necessary to maintain a healthy 
population over a chosen period of time.150 
                                                 
145
 Id. 
146
 Id. 
147
 36 C.F.R. § 219.26 (2000). 
148
 Corbin, supra note 108, at 397. 
149
 As one commentator has noted: 
The advantages are obvious.  In an age of budgetary and personnel constraints, land management 
agencies like the Forest Service can not afford outlays of resources necessary to individually 
manage each species in an ecosystem.  The ability to meet a seemingly impossible obligation to 
maintain viable populations of all wildlife by simply monitoring a handful of species is to move 
from the impossible to the probable. 
Id. 
150
 Id. at 396. 
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 It soon became apparent, however, that the MIS approach to protecting 
biodiversity was not a panacea.  Even though it is less resource-intensive than an 
approach based upon monitoring of all species within an ecosystem, it nevertheless 
requires the accumulation of large amounts of information, and sometimes that 
information is difficult to obtain.  In addition, the extrapolation from the impacts of 
management actions on one or a selected small group of species to the effects of those 
actions on an entire ecosystem upon which the entire approach depends is fraught with 
uncertainty.  This is particularly likely to be true if little is understood about the natural 
fluctuations of the MIS.151 
 
 These difficulties prompted the Forest Service to consider using the habitat-based 
rather than the population viability approach.  Under this second approach, planners do 
not seek to keep track of the population numbers of the designated MIS.  Instead, they 
assess the effects of management actions on the habitat of the MIS, based on the 
assumption that “the presence of adequate healthy habitat for a species would indicate the 
presence of viable populations of those species.”152  This “proxy-on-proxy” approach has 
been described as follows: 
 
For this approach, the Forest Service designates the first proxy level by selecting 
several MISs that the Service believes will represent the needs of various types of 
wildlife that live throughout the forest and share the same habitat needs as the 
designated MISs.  Each MIS acts as an indicator, or proxy, for many other 
species.  The Forest Service does not inventory or monitor the population of each 
MIS, but instead designates certain types and quantities of habitat that it deems 
sufficient to maintain viable populations of the selected MISs.  The Service then 
assesses the impact of a proposed management activity on the habitats and, 
consequently, on the populations of the MISs and the species that the MISs 
represent.153 
 
 The benefit of the proxy-on-proxy simulation approach is that it avoids the need 
to do any population monitoring whatsoever.  The agency can fulfill its responsibility to 
protect biodiversity through the planning process simply by assuming that if sufficient 
habitat acreage for the MIS (as defined by the agency’s scientists) remains following a 
particular management action such as a timber harvest, then a viable population of the 
MIS must necessarily also exist.  Because the MIS is a surrogate for the other species 
present in the area affected, a viable population of MIS necessarily translates into plant 
                                                 
151
 Id. at 397-98.  Corbin asserts that: 
It is simply naive, in an ecological sense, to assume that effects on one species will mirror those 
on all other species within an ecosystem. . . .  Choosing an appropriate indicator species requires a 
detailed understanding of the species selected, how it reacts to changes in its habitat, and how the 
larger community reflects those changes.  For most of the nation’s forest system, the detailed data 
required to select indicator species did not exist when NFMA was passed, and likely does not exist 
in an appreciably greater amount today. 
Id. 
152
 Seidman & Burdin, supra note 139, at 41. 
153
 Id. 
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and animal diversity sufficient to satisfy the NFMA planning provisions.154  It may not 
even be necessary for the habitat to exist in any particular location or condition.155 
 
 The courts have taken divergent approaches when faced with the question of 
whether the proxy-on-proxy simulation approach is consistent with the Forest Service’s 
responsibility to provide for diversity of plant and animal communities.156  The Ninth 
Circuit first addressed the validity of that approach in the Inland Empire Public Lands 
Council case.157  The issue was whether the Forest Service complied with its regulations 
implementing the diversity requirement, and in particular, with the regulatory provision 
that dictated that fish and wildlife habitat be managed to maintain viable populations of 
vertebrate populations.158  The environmental group plaintiffs contended that the agency 
violated the statutory diversity requirement and the viability regulation by failing to 
examine the population dynamics of MIS in old-growth forests in which timber harvests 
were scheduled.  The Forest Service responded that its habitat viability analyses 
sufficed.159  The court approved the agency’s conclusion that a species would remain 
viable as long as the percentage of each type of habitat (such as nesting, feeding, or 
denning) remaining after the timber sales would be greater than required for the species 
to survive.  According to the court, that assumption was “eminently reasonable”160 and 
the Forest Service’s analysis was sound because it used all of the scientific data then 
available.161 
 
 In subsequent cases, the Ninth Circuit has held that the Forest Service’s approval 
of timber sales violated the 1982 regulations implementing the NFMA’s diversity 
requirement because, even though the proxy-on-proxy approach is valid as a general 
proposition, the agency relied on habitat monitoring methodologies that were arbitrary 
and capricious.162  The court summarized its precedents concerning the legality of the 
                                                 
154
 The burdens on the agency of pursuing the proxy-on-proxy approach are particularly light if the agency 
has already collected habitat data in making timber inventories.  See Corbin, supra note 108, at 401. 
155
 Thus, Corbin asserts, “[d]isturbance, such as logging, is not precluded because its impact on the species 
will never be detected.”  Id. 
156
 The courts also have addressed the validity of the Forest Service’s use of models or surrogates in 
connection with other NFMA requirements concerning habitat for MIS.  See, e.g., Western Watersheds 
Project v. United States Forest Serv., 62 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1142 (D. Idaho 2006) (holding that the 
Forest Service acted improperly by using a model for estimating the effects of grazing in seeking to comply 
with NFMA regulation requiring that forest plans determine “the suitability and potential capability of 
[NFS] lands for producing forage for grazing animals and for providing habitat for [MIS]”). 
157
 Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. United States Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1996). 
158
 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1998). 
159
 Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council, 88 F.3d at 759. 
160
 Id. at 761. 
161
 Id. at 762. 
162
 Earth Island Inst. v. United States Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that the 
Forest Service improperly relied on habitat analyses in lieu of population monitoring where there was no 
evidence that it consulted current or accurate field studies and failed to identify the methodology it used in 
determining what constitutes suitable habitat); Idaho Sporting Cong., Inc. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 
972-73 (9th Cir. 2002).  See also Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. United States Forest Serv., 2007 WL 1417163, 
No. 05-17093 (9th Cir. May 9, 2007) (invalidating proxy-on-proxy analysis because the Forest Service 
neither analyzed acreage needed by MIS nor analyzed how much suitable acreage would remain in the 
project area after the project was completed); Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1063-65 (9th Cir. 
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Forest Service’s reliance on the proxy-on-proxy approach as follows:  the agency could 
satisfy the diversity requirement by assessing the impact of particular management 
actions such as timber harvests on habitat “only where both the Forest Service’s 
knowledge of what quality and quantity of habitat is necessary to support the species and 
the Forest Service’s method for measuring the existing amount of that habitat are 
reasonably reliable and accurate.”163  
 
 Other courts refused to allow the Forest Service to rely on the proxy-on-proxy 
approach at all.  In Sierra Club v. Martin, for example, the Eleventh Circuit concluded 
that habitat analysis did not comply with the requirement of the 1982 regulations that the 
Forest Service monitor population trends of MIS and their relationships to habitat 
changes.164  The court held that the agency’s approval of timber sales was arbitrary and 
capricious because it failed to gather quantitative data on MIS and use that data to 
measure the impact of habitat changes on the forest’s diversity.165  Other courts agreed 
                                                                                                                                                 
2005) (holding that the Forest Service violated the diversity mandate by assuming that commercial thinning 
and prescribed burning activities in old-growth forests would be beneficial to old-growth dependent species 
on the basis of an unverified hypothesis). 
163
 Native Ecosystems Council v. United States Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1250 (9th Cir. 2005).  See also 
Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. United States Forest Serv., 2007 WL 1417163, at *10, No. 05-17093 (9th Cir. May 
9, 2007) (stating that ‘we have previously endorsed the practice [of using habitat as a proxy for population] 
absent some indication in the record that USFS’s underlying methodology is flawed”); Cascadia Wildlands 
Project v. United States Forest Serv., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1163 (D. Or. 2005) (stating that “if the 
methodology used for evaluating the effect of a plan on MIS populations is reasonably accurate, there is no 
absolute requirement that the Forest Service conduct population counts of MIS when analyzing 
management alternatives”); League of Wilderness Defenders—Blue Mountain Biodiversity Project v. 
Bosworth, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1303 (D. Or. 2005) (stating that, “[i]n the Ninth Circuit, . . . habitat 
analysis as a proxy for monitoring population trends is sufficient under the 1982 regulations where the 
methodology utilized by the Forest Service is sound”).  In a case involving alleged noncompliance with the 
monitoring requirements of a NFMA forest plan, the court stated that the reliability of habitat capability 
models “may be jeopardized in either of two ways:  If either ‘monitoring were not taking place, or if the 
on-going monitoring reveals that the [habitat capability model] is not meeting expectations,’ then the Forest 
Service cannot rely on the surrogate methodology of the model.”  Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Blackwell, 389 
F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1213 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (quoting Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. United States Fish and 
Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004)).  The court in Gifford Pinchot held that the Forest 
Service may use changes in habitat to assess whether an agency’s actions would violate the prohibition on 
jeopardizing species listed under the ESA if it “’reasonably ensures’” that the proxy results mirror reality.”  
Gifford Pinchot, 378 F.3d at 1066 (quoting Idaho Sporting Cong., Inc. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 972-
73 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
164
 Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F.3d 1, 7 & n.10 (11th Cir. 1999)  The 1982 regulations provided that 
“[p]opulation trends of the [MIS] will be monitored and relationships to habitat changes will be 
determined.  Id. at 5 (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 219.19).   
165
 Id. at 7.  The Forest Service lacked population data for half of the MIS in the forest in which the sales 
had been proposed.  A federal district court later interpreted Martin as allowing the Forest Service to rely 
on estimating procedures such as sampling or surveys to satisfy MIS data collection requirements.  In 
particular, it concluded that the Forest Service may rely on sampling data for fish MIS, numerical survey 
data for vertebrate MIS, and descriptive reports for plant MIS.  Forest Conservation Council v. Jacobs, 374 
F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1203-04 (N.D. Ga. 2005), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Ouachita Watch League v. 
Jacobs, 463 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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with the Eleventh Circuit that the 1982 regulations did not permit the Forest Service to 
substitute habitat information for actual, quantitative population data.166 
 
   c. The 2000 Planning Regulations 
 
 The Forest Service adopted the first substantial revisions to the 1982 planning 
rules in November 2000, just three months before the end of the Clinton 
Administration.167  Those regulations never went into effect, however.  Acting at least in 
part in response to concerns over the 2000 regulations expressed by the Society of 
American Foresters,168 the Department of Agriculture first extended by one year the 
effective date of the 2000 regulations169 and then delayed compliance until the 
promulgation of a new final planning rule.170 
 
 The 2000 regulations required that each LRMP “contain a practicable, effective, 
and efficient monitoring strategy to evaluate sustainability in the plan area” and that the 
strategy “require monitoring of appropriate plan decisions and characteristics of 
sustainability.”171  In particular, the regulations required monitoring of both ecosystem 
and species diversity.  With respect to the former, the regulations required evaluation of 
“the status and trend of selected physical and biological characteristics of ecosystem 
diversity” and documentation of “the reasons for selection of characteristics to be 
                                                 
166
 E.g., Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 372 F.3d 1219, 1225-27 (10th Cir. 2004).  See also Utah Envtl. 
Cong. v. Bosworth, 439 F.3d 1184, 1191 (10th Cir. 2006); Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Zieroth, 190 F. Supp. 2d 
1265, 1271-72 (Utah 2002) (holding that Forest Service regulations require collection of quantitative data 
on populations to measure the impact of habitat changes on forest diversity and that habitat data may not be 
used as a proxy); Forest Guardians v. United States Forest Serv., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1281 (D.N.M. 
2001) (holding that the Forest Service’s regulations require that it collect population data, not just habitat 
trend data, for MIS).   
The 10th Circuit also held, however, that the agency need not develop forest-wide data if it can 
determine the viability of the MIS at issue without a forest-wide survey but that it must engage in good 
faith efforts to confirm the presence or absence of MIS.  Utah Envtl. Cong., 372 F.3d at 1230.  In an earlier 
case, the 10th Circuit held that the diversity regulations did not require the Forest Service to collect 
population data or make data-based population viability assessments in the absence of any evidence that 
MIS existed in the affected area.  Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1170 (10th Cir. 
1999). Cf. Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Troyer, 479 F.3d 1269, 1286 (10th Cir. 2007) (confirming that although the 
1982 regulations required quantitative population data, “we otherwise imposed no specific requirements on 
the type of data that must be collected,” and upholding the Forest Service’s conclusion that the available 
population data were scientifically useful). 
167
 National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,514 (Nov. 9, 2000). 
168
 The Society for American Foresters is “the national scientific and educational organization representing 
the forestry profession in the United States.”  Society of American Foresters, Mission Statement, available 
at http:/www.safnet.org/who/whoweare.cfm. 
169
 National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Extension of Deadline Compliance; 
Interim Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 27,552 (May 17, 2001) (asserting that the agency was not prepared to fully 
implement the rule nationwide). 
170
 National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Extension of Deadline Compliance; 
Interim Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,341 (May 20, 2002).  For discussion of the Bush Administration’s 
delays in implementing the 2000 planning regulations, see Alyson Flournoy et al., In Name Only:  How the 
Bush Administration's National Forest Planning Rule Frees the Forest Service from Mandatory Standards 
and Public Accountability, Center for Progressive Reform White Paper 508 (June 2005), at 5-6, available 
at http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/Forests_508.pdf. 
171
 36 C.F.R. § 219.11 (2001). 
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monitored, monitoring objectives, methodology, and designate critical values that will 
prompt reviews of plan decisions.”172  Monitoring of species diversity had to evaluate 
“focal species”173 and selected “species-at-risk.”174 
 
 The 2000 regulations required monitoring of ecological conditions, but did not 
generally require population monitoring.  The regulations, however, specified that a 
particular plan’s monitoring strategy “may require population monitoring for some focal 
species and some species-at-risk,” which could be accomplished by methods such as 
population occurrence and presence/absence data, sampling population characteristics, 
using population indices to track relative population trends, or inferring population status 
from ecological conditions.175  Planning officials were to decide whether to monitor 
populations, and if so to select the methods for doing so, based on factors that included 
the degree of risk to the species, the degree to which particular species characteristics 
lend themselves to monitoring, the reasons for listing a species as a focal species or 
species-at-risk, and the strength of association between ecological conditions and 
population dynamics.  The regulations stated that population trend monitoring “is often 
appropriate in those cases where risk to species viability is high and population 
characteristics cannot be reliably inferred from ecological conditions.”176  Any document 
authorizing site-specific action also had to describe required monitoring and 
evaluation.177  Monitoring methods could be changed to reflect new information without 
the need to amend or revise the applicable LRMP.178 
 
 The regulations designated the first priority for NFMA planning and management 
to be the maintenance or restoration of ecological sustainability of the national forests.179  
The Forest Service regarded both ecosystem and species diversity as components of 
ecological sustainability.180  Ecosystem diversity included several characteristics, 
                                                 
172
 36 C.F.R. § 219.11(a)(1)(i) (2001). 
173
 The regulations defined focal species as follows: 
Focal species are surrogate measures used in the evaluation of ecological sustainability, including 
species and ecosystem diversity.  The key characteristic of a focal species is that its status and 
trend provide insights to the integrity of the larger ecological system to which it belongs.  
Individual species, or groups of species that use habitat in similar ways or which perform similar 
ecological functions, may be identified as focal species.  Focal species serve an umbrella function 
in terms of encompassing habitats needed for many other species, play a key role in maintaining 
community structure or processes, are sensitive to the changes likely to occur in the area, or 
otherwise serve as an indicator of ecological sustainability.  Certain focal species may be used as 
surrogates to represent ecological conditions that provide for viability of some other species, 
rather than directly representing the population dynamics of those other species. 
36 C.F.R. § 219.36 (2001) (emphasis added). 
174
 Species at risk were defined as “[f]ederally listed endangered, threatened, candidate, and proposed 
species and other species for which loss of viability, including reduction in distribution or abundance, is a 
concern within the plan area.  Other species-at-risk may include sensitive species and state listed species.  
A species-at-risk also may be selected as a focal species.”  36 C.F.R. § 219.36 (2001). 
175
 36 C.F.R. § 219.11(a)(1)(ii)(B) (2001). 
176
 36 C.F.R. § 219.11(a)(1)(ii)(C) (2001). 
177
 36 C.F.R. § 219.11(b) (2001). 
178
 36 C.F.R. § 219.11(c) (2001). 
179
 36 C.F.R. § 219.2 (2001). 
180
 36 C.F.R. § 219.20(a)(1) (2001). 
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including major vegetation types, water resources, soil resources, air resources, and focal 
species that provide “insights to the larger ecological systems with which they are 
associated.”181  Species diversity was defined in terms of species characteristics that 
included “the number, distribution, and geographic ranges of plant and animal species, 
including focal species and species-at-risk that serve as surrogate measures of species 
diversity.  Species-at-risk and focal species must be identified for the plan area.”182   
 
Planners had to evaluate ecological sustainability by describing the current status 
of both ecosystem and species diversity, risks to ecological sustainability, the cumulative 
effects of human and natural disturbances, and the contributions of NFS lands to the 
ecological sustainability of all lands within the area being analyzed.183  The evaluation of 
ecosystem diversity had to include “[i]nformation about focal species that provide 
insights to the integrity of the larger ecological system to which they belong.”184  The 
evaluation of species diversity had to include, “as appropriate,” assessments of the risks 
to species viability and the identification of ecological conditions needed to maintain 
species viability over time.  Individual species assessments for the viability of any 
endangered, threatened, or candidate species under the ESA were mandatory, while for 
all other species, the regulations authorized a variety of evaluative approaches, including 
“individual species assessments and assessments of focal species or other indicators used 
as surrogates in the evaluation of ecological conditions needed to maintain species 
viability.”185 
 
 The regulations required that plan decisions that would affect ecological 
sustainability be based on the evaluations of ecosystem and species diversity.  Plan 
decisions affecting ecosystem diversity had to provide for maintenance or restoration of 
the characteristics of ecosystem composition and structure within the range of variability 
expected under natural disturbance regimes.  Where definition of the range of variability 
was impractical, plan decisions had to “provide for measurable progress toward 
maintaining or restoring ecosystem diversity,” based on independently peer-reviewed 
scientific methods other than the expected range of variability to maintain or restore 
ecosystem diversity.186  Plan decisions affecting species diversity had to “provide for 
ecological conditions that the responsible official determines provide a high likelihood 
that those conditions are capable of supporting over time the viability of native and 
desired non-native species well distributed throughout their ranges within the plan 
area.”187 
 
                                                 
181
 36 C.F.R. § 219.20(a)(1)(i) (2001). 
182
 36 C.F.R. § 219.20(a)(1)(ii) (2001) (emphasis added). 
183
 36 C.F.R. § 219.20(a)(2) (2001). 
184
 36 C.F.R. § 219.20(a)(2)(i)(A) (2001).  The agency also had to describe the effects of human activity on 
ecosystem diversity.  Id. § 219.20(a)(2)(i)(E). 
185
 36 C.F.R. § 219.20(a)(2)(ii) (2001) (emphasis added).  The regulations provided that, with the  
exception of species listed under the ESA, assessments of functional, taxonomic, or habitat groups rather 
than individual species “may be appropriate” for species groups that contain many species.  Id. 
186
 36 C.F.R. § 219.20(b)(1) (2001). 
187
 36 C.F.R. § 219.20(b)(2)(i) (2001). 
To be published at 83 Indiana L.J., Issue # 2 
U:\Word\articles\NFMA data gaps ssrn.doc 
glicksman Page 36 7/13/2007 
 The planning regulations issued during the Clinton Administration thus set as the 
first priority of the NFMA planning process the maintenance or restoration of ecological 
sustainability.  The regulations appeared to treat ecosystem and species diversity as 
equally important components of ecological sustainability.  Planning officials had to 
conduct evaluations of both kinds of diversity, and plan decisions had to protect both 
kinds of diversity.  Every LRMP had to include a monitoring strategy to evaluate 
sustainability in the plan area.  The 2000 regulations replaced the concept of the MIS 
with two new surrogate measures of both components of ecological sustainability, focal 
species and species-at-risk.  Both focal species and species at risk had to be evaluated as 
part of the process of monitoring species diversity.  In addition, the regulations included 
focal species as one of the characteristics of ecosystem diversity because such species 
provide insights into the condition of the larger ecosystem of which they are a part. 
 
The regulations did not mandate population monitoring of affected species in all 
cases.  They recognized, however, that population monitoring might be necessary for 
focal species and species-at-risk through any of several illustrative methodologies, based 
on factors such as the degree of risk being experienced by the species, the degree to 
which the species lend themselves to population monitoring, and the strength of the 
association between ecological conditions and population dynamics.  The regulations 
declared population monitoring to be particularly appropriate in situations marked by 
high risk to species viability and inability to infer reliable population characteristics from 
ecological conditions.  In short, the 2000 regulations continued to rely heavily on the 
effects of management actions on designated species as surrogates for the ability to 
maintain plant and animal diversity in the national forests. 
 
   d. The 2005 Planning Regulations 
 
 Based on its conclusion that the 2000 planning regulations were difficult to 
implement and failed to clarify the “programmatic nature” of land and resource 
management planning,188 the Forest Service completely scrapped the 2000 regulations 
and replaced them with a new set of regulations in 2005.189  The Forest Service, which 
adopted the new regulations without convening a Committee of Scientists,190 
characterized the 2005 regulations as “a paradigm shift in land management planning.”191  
For one thing, although the 2005 regulations nominally retain sustainability as the overall 
goal of the NFMA planning process,192 the regulations deemphasize the ecological 
component of sustainability by declaring sustainability to be composed of three 
“interrelated and interdependent” components:  social, economic, and ecological 
                                                 
188
 National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Proposed Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 72,770, 
72,770-71 (Dec. 6, 2002). 
189
 National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023 (Jan. 
5, 2005). 
190
 See Flournoy et al., supra note 170, at 7. 
191
 70 Fed. Reg. at 1024.  Representative Tom Udall of New Mexico called the 2005 regulations “a radical 
overhaul of forest policy.”  Flournoy et al., supra note 170, at 7 (quoting Juliet Eilperin, New Rules Issued 
for National Forests; Some Environmental Protections Eased, THE WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 24, 2004, at 
A1). 
192
 36 C.F.R. § 219.10 (2006). 
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sustainability.193  Included among the changes in approach reflected in the 2005 
regulations was a shift away from assessment of species diversity to assessment of 
ecosystem diversity as a means of implementing the NFMA’s diversity requirement.  In 
particular, the 2005 regulations abandoned the approaches reflected in both the 1982 and 
2000 regulations for monitoring the effect of management actions on species selected on 
the basis of their capacity to serve as surrogates for the diversity of plant and animal 
species in the affected planning area as a whole. 
 
 The 2005 regulations state that the overall goal of the ecological element of 
sustainability is “to provide a framework to contribute to sustaining native ecological 
systems by providing ecological conditions to support diversity of native plant and 
animal species in the plan area.”194  Achieving this goal “will satisfy the statutory 
requirement to provide for diversity of plant and animal communities based on the 
suitability and capability of the specific land area in order to meet overall multiple-use 
objectives.”195  Unlike the 2000 regulations, the 2005 regulations declare ecosystem 
diversity to be the “primary means by which a plan contributes to sustaining ecological 
systems” and LRMPs therefore “must establish a framework to provide the 
characteristics of ecosystem diversity in the plan area.”196  The plan must include 
additional measures to protect species diversity only if planning officials determine that 
the plan provisions designed to protect ecosystem diversity are insufficient to provide 
appropriate ecological conditions for specific endangered or threatened species, species-
of-concern, or species-of-interest.197  It is within that broad framework that the 2005 
                                                 
193
 70 Fed. Reg. at 1028.  See also 36 C.F.R. § 219.10 (2006) (stating that “sustainability, for any unit of the 
National Forest System, has three interrelated and interdependent elements:  social, economic, and 
ecological,” and that a LRMP “can contribute to sustainability by creating a framework to guide on-the-
ground management of projects and activities,” but cannot itself ensure sustainability).  For discussion of 
the shift in emphasis away from ecological sustainability, see Flournoy et al., supra note 170, at 9-11; 
Robert L. Glicksman, Traveling in Opposite Directions:  Roadless Area Management Under the Clinton 
and Bush Administrations, 34 ENVTL. L. 1143, 1172-76, 1204-07 (2004). 
194
 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(a) (2006). 
195
 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(a) (2006). 
196
 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(a)(1) (2006).  The Forest Service now defines ecosystem diversity as “the variety 
and relative extent of ecosystem types including their composition, structure, and processes.”  Forest 
Service Handbook (FSH) 1909.12, § 43.1.  Agency officials are to evaluate ecosystem diversity by 
identifying selected ecosystem characteristics, assessing their natural variation under historic disturbance 
regimes, and comparing that to existing and projected future conditions.  Id. § 43.1.1.  Compare the 
following definition of ecosystem diversity: 
The concept of “ecosystem diversity” refers to the variety of biological communities and their 
physical settings and can be used to associate species with their required habitat.  This association 
between habitat and ecosystem diversity is possible because a species' habitat is selected from the 
ecosystems available to that species (i.e., habitat is a subset of ecosystems for a specific species). 
Seidman & Burdin, supra note 139, at 42. 
197
 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(a)(2) (2006).  "Species-of-concern" are those species for which their continued 
existence is a concern and listing under the ESA may occur.  Id. § 219.16.  "Species-of-interest" are species 
for which the responsible planning official determines that management actions may be necessary or 
desirable to achieve ecological or other multiple use objectives.  Id.  The Forest Service directives will 
describe “a systematic, scientifically credible, and efficient approach, using existing information, to 
identify species-of-concern and species-of-interest.”  70 Fed. Reg. at 1048.  See also FSH 1909.12, §§ 
43.22b-43.2c (defining species-of-concern as “species for which the Responsible Official determines 
management actions may be necessary to prevent listing under [ESA]” and species-of-interest as “species 
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regulations address the responsibility of planning officials to rely on the “best available 
science” and to take steps to protect the diversity of plant and animal species. 
 
    (1) The Use of the Best Available Science 
 
 The 2005 NFMA planning regulations state that agency planning officials “must 
take into account the best available science.”198  The agency’s position is that it is 
impossible to provide a substantive definition of the “best available science”199 in a 
regulation or directive.200  As a result, the agency’s approach to describing its 
responsibility to take the best available science into account is process-based.  The 2005 
regulations, amplified by agency directives,201 describe a four-step discovery process 
that, when followed, is supposed to insure that planners satisfy the requirement that the 
best available science be taken into account and that it will properly influence plan 
components.202  For purposes of the planning regulations, “taking into account the best 
available science” requires planning officials to (1) document how the best available 
science was taken into account in the planning process, (2-3) evaluate and disclose 
substantial scientific uncertainties and substantial risks associated with plan components 
based on that science, and (4) document that the agency appropriately interpreted and 
applied the science.203  This process of evaluation and disclosure of uncertainty and risk 
                                                                                                                                                 
for which the Responsible Official determines that management actions may be necessary or desirable to 
achieve ecological or other multiple-use objectives”). 
198
 36 C.F.R. § 219.11(a) (2006). 
199
 The agency has taken a stab at defining the term science, however.  According to the Forest Service 
Manual (FSM), 
[s]cience refers to knowledge, information, concepts, methods, and theories based on organized 
systems of facts learned from study, observation, and experience.  Science is brought into the 
planning process through evaluations, other information gathering, and syntheses.  The application 
of science in planning provides the Responsible Official with knowledge, methods, and expert 
review in order to inform the planning process. 
FSM 1921.8. 
200
 Cf. The Ecology Ctr. v. United States Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1183, 1194 n.4 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that 
“we have not found, nor have the parties cited, any cases that define ‘best available science’ in today’s 
context”). 
201
 “The Forest Service directives consist of the Forest Service Manual (FSM) and the Forest Service 
Handbook (FSH), which contain the agency’s policies, practices, and procedures and serve as the primary 
basis for the internal management and control of programs and administrative direction to Forest Service 
employees. The directives for all agency programs are set out on the World Wide Web/Internet at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/im/directives.”  National Forest System Land Management Planning Directives; 
Notice, 71 Fed. Reg. 5124, 5124 (Jan. 31, 2006). 
202
 71 Fed. Reg. at 5130. 
203
 36 C.F.R. § 219.11(a) (2006).  The FSM provides a slightly different description of the four-step 
process: 
The Responsible Official shall demonstrate that the best available science (36 CFR 219.11) is 
taken into account during the planning process by using appropriate procedures including:  1.  
Timely and comprehensive gathering of peer-reviewed and other quality-controlled literature, 
studies, or reports related to the planning issues.  2.  Assessing the information for pertinence 
based on objectivity, utility, relevance, and integrity.  3.  Synthesizing the pertinent information 
for application in the planning process.  4.  Based on assumptions and professional judgment, 
applying the best available science synthesis to the planning process, including developing plan 
components and evaluating plan outcomes. 
FSM 1921.81. 
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is designed to “provide a crosscheck for appropriate interpretation of science and help[ ] 
clarify the limitations of the information base for the plan.”204  Planners may meet these 
requirements by using independent peer review, a science advisory board, or “other 
review methods to evaluate the consideration of science in the planning process.”205  
According to the Forest Service, this four-step process “represents the state-of-the art for 
science review for natural resource management.”206 
 
 Agency planning officials must conduct substantive reviews of the best available 
science applied during the planning process.  The review process must include, at a 
minimum, an assessment of the scientific credibility of (1) the methods selected and 
applied to evaluate a plan’s components; (2) information gathered and applied for these 
evaluations; and (3) synthesis, interpretation, and inferences drawn from these 
evaluations.207  These review procedures are described more fully in the Forest Service 
Handbook (FSH).  The purpose of the reviews, according to the FSH, “is to enhance and 
maximize the quality and credibility of plans and planning evaluations” and “review how 
the best available science was taken into account, not to add to the body of scientific 
knowledge.”208  A science review, as described in the FSH, should address four main 
questions: 
 
1.  Has applicable and available scientific information been considered?  2.  Has 
scientific information been interpreted reasonably and accurately?  3.  Are the 
uncertainties associated with the scientific information acknowledged and 
documented?  4.  Have the relevant trends of social, economic, and ecological 
resources . . . , including risks and uncertainties, been identified and 
documented?209 
 
 The Forest Service has explained in the Forest Service Manual (FSM)210 that the 
“best available science” may be uncertain due to evolving understandings of social, 
economic, and ecological processes and conditions.  The sources of uncertainty identified 
by the agency include incomplete or conflicting scientific information; assumptions, 
interpretation, and extrapolation of information; and predictions of future trends or 
conditions.  The Manual concedes that some level of uncertainty will continue to exist 
even if planning officials comply with their responsibility to take into account the best 
available science.  It accordingly requires that they evaluate substantial uncertainty in the 
                                                 
204
 70 Fed. Reg. at 1027. 
205
 36 C.F.R. § 219.11(b) (2006). 
206
 71 Fed. Reg. at 5130. 
207
 FSM 1921.85. 
208
 FSH 1909.12, § 41.1 (also stating that “[s]cience reviews allow [planners] to document that the best 
available science was taken into account in the planning process” and that “[r]eviews should be conducted 
in a timely and expeditious manner to provide useful feedback”). 
209
 FSH 1909.12, § 41.1. 
210
 The Forest Service has described the FSM, which form part of the agency’s “directives,” as a document 
that “contains legal authorities, objectives, policies, responsibilities, instructions, and guidance needed on a 
continuing basis by Forest Service line officers and primary staff to plan and execute programs and 
activities, while the FSH is generally the principal source of specialized guidance and instruction for 
carrying out the policies, objectives, and responsibilities contained in the FSM.”  National Forest System 
Land Management Planning Directives; Notice, 71 Fed. Reg. 5124, 5124 (Jan. 31, 2006). 
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best available science by identifying its sources and assessing how it affects the planning 
process.211   
 
 The “best available science mandate” of the 2005 planning regulations is a 
watered-down version of the proposed planning rules issued by the Forest Service in 
2002.  Those rules would have required that agency planning decisions “be consistent 
with” the best available science, rather than that planners merely “take into account” the 
best available science.  The Forest Service stated in the preamble to the final regulations 
that, despite the change in language, “[t]he actual process for taking into account science 
in planning has not changed from the 2002 proposed rule.”212  The agency added, 
however, that science is “only one aspect of decisionmaking” (albeit a “significant source 
of information”) and that public input, competing use demands, budget projections,213 
and “many other factors” are also relevant to planning decisions.214 
 
This open-ended recitation of potentially relevant factors provides ample room for 
political factors to override science as the basis for planning decisions without an 
acknowledgment by the agency of the actual basis for its decision.  At a minimum, the 
failure to specify what these “other factors” might be, and how they are supposed to be 
weighted in comparison to science and other factors in the decisionmaking process, is 
likely to hinder the transparency of the planning process and make it more difficult for 
interested persons to provide meaningful input.  The agency’s decision to shift much of 
the detailed description of the planning process requirements from regulations published 
in the Code of Federal Regulations to the lesser known agency “directives” (which 
include the Forest Service Manual and the Forest Service Handbook) may exacerbate 
these difficulties.215 
 
                                                 
211
 FSM 1921.82.  See also id. 1921.84 (requiring that planning officials disclose “evaluations of substantial 
uncertainty and risk in the plan set of documents” and that the disclosure of uncertainty “include the 
evidence for and controversy regarding key assumptions that influence planning outcomes.”). 
212
 70 Fed. Reg. at 1027.  The agency also asserted that the 2005 regulations “retain[ ] the emphasis in the 
2002 proposed rule on the consideration of science in planning, on documenting how science was 
interpreted and applied, and on evaluating the associated risks and uncertainties of using that science.”  Id. 
at 1048. 
213
 According to the FSM, “[c]ost should be considered in the decision of how to apply the best available 
science in the planning effort.”  FSM 1921.81. 
214
 70 Fed. Reg. at 1027.  See also id. at 1048 (explaining that “[t]he words ‘consistent with’ ha[ve] been 
replaced by ‘take into account’ because this term better expresses that formal science is just one source of 
information for the Responsible Official and only one aspect of decisionmaking”  ). 
215
 The Forest Service stated in the preamble to the 2005 regulations that: 
The final rule does not include many of the specific analytical processes and requirements set out 
in the 2002 proposed rule.  Appropriate processes will be included in the Forest Service directives.  
The Department believes it is more appropriate to put specific procedural analytical requirements 
in the Forest Service directives rather than in the rule itself so that the analytical procedures can be 
changed more rapidly if new and better techniques emerge.  As for other portions of the Forest 
Service directives, public notice and comment is required where there is substantial public interest 
or controversy. 
70 Fed. Reg. at 1028.  The agency also defended this shift on the ground that the “directives can be more 
extensive and can be more easily changed as the agency learns how to improve its analytic processes and as 
new scientific concepts and new technological capabilities become available.”  Id. at 1029. 
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    (2) Protection of Diversity 
 
 One of the most fundamental alterations that the 2005 NFMA planning 
regulations make in the approaches reflected in the 1982 and 2000 regulations relates to 
the manner in which they require the Forest Service to monitor, assess,216 and protect 
biodiversity.  The Forest Service explained in the preamble to the 2005 regulations that, 
thirty years after the adoption of the NFMA, the concepts of biological diversity at 
different spatial and temporal scales (including genetic, species, structural, and functional 
diversity) have been substantially refined.  The complexity of the concept of biological 
diversity, according to the agency, requires “a corresponding complicated array of 
concepts, measures, and values from several scientific disciplines.”217  The Forest Service 
settled as its foundational principle that “maintenance of the diversity of plant and animal 
communities starts with an ecosystem approach,” which seeks to “provide a framework 
for maintaining and restoring ecosystem conditions necessary to conserve most 
species.”218  The more effective a plan is in protecting ecosystem diversity, “the less need 
there is for species-specific analysis.”219  Accordingly, it is only when Forest Service 
planners determine that the ecosystem approach fails to provide an adequate framework 
for maintaining and restoring conditions to support species listed under the ESA, species-
of-concern, and species-of-interest that the plan must include additional provisions for 
those species.220  LRMPs should provide “measures for accounting for progress toward 
ecosystem and species diversity goals. . . .  Progress toward desired conditions and 
objectives will be monitored and the results made available to the public. The adaptive 
monitoring and feedback process will help maintain and improve diversity.”221 
                                                 
216
 “In the most general sense, ecological risk assessment involves estimating the likelihood that an 
identified hazard will have a negative effect, and estimating the ecological consequences of that negative 
effect.”  GARY K. MEFFE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 376 (2d ed. 1997). 
217
 70 Fed. Reg. at 1028. 
218
 Id.  See also id. at 1047-48 (stating that the “ecosystem diversity framework provides an essential 
ecological context and identifies the unique contributions that lands can make to the three elements of 
sustainability”). 
219
 Id. at 1048. 
220
 Id. at 1028.  See also 71 Fed. Reg. at 5137 (stating that the 2005 planning rule “stipulates that the 
species diversity approach is to be used when the components set up through ecosystem diversity need to 
be supplemented to provide appropriate ecological conditions for listed species, species-of-concern, and 
species-of-interest”); FSH 1909.12, § 43.25 (stating that “[a]s a rule, provisions in plan components for 
conservation of species should focus first on providing appropriate amounts and distribution of suitable 
habitat throughout the plan area over time,” and that “[o]nly where a broad-scale ecosystem diversity 
framework will not provide appropriate ecological conditions for listed species, species-of-concern, and 
species-of-interest, should small spatial scales be considered or analyzed”).  The Forest Service 
characterized its approach as “a complementary ecosystem and species diversity approach for ecological 
sustainability.”  70 Fed. Reg. at 1029. 
 A 2006 report issued by the H. John Heinz Center for Science, Economics and the Environment 
identified ten key information gaps that prevent effective reporting on key indicators of the condition and 
use of U.S. ecosystems. The ten data gaps related to both species and ecosystem health.  See THE H. JOHN 
HEINZ CENTER FOR SCIENCE, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, FILLING THE GAPS: PRIORITY DATA 
NEEDS AND KEY MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES FOR NATIONAL REPORTING ON ECOSYSTEM CONDITION 21 
(May 2006), available at http://www.heinzctr.org/publications.shtml.  
221
 70 Fed. Reg. at 1028.  See also Seidman & Burdin, supra note 139, at 43 (stating that the 2005 
regulations “recognize that the planning process should include monitoring of progress toward ecosystem 
and species diversity”). 
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 In marked contrast to the 1982 regulations222 and the 2002 proposed 
regulations,223 the 2005 planning regulations do not require that the Forest Service 
provide for viable populations of plant and animal species.  The Forest Service provided 
three principal explanations for this omission.  First, the agency concluded based on 
experience “that ensuring species viability is not always possible” due to problems such 
as species-specific distribution problems, declines in species due to factors beyond the 
agency’s control, or the inability of available land to support species.224  Second, NFS 
units contain “very large” numbers of recognized species, and the Forest Service found it 
“clearly impractical” to analyze all those species.  Further, previous attempts to analyze 
the full suite of species via groups, surrogates, and representatives have had mixed 
success in practice.”225  Third, the agency’s past focus on the viability requirement 
diverted attention and resources away from an ecosystem-based approach to land 
management, which the Forest Service now considers to be “the most efficient and 
effective way to manage for the broadest range of species with the limited resources 
available for the task.”226 
 
 Similarly, the 2005 planning regulations do not impose any requirements that 
LRMPs dictate population monitoring.  The Forest Service explained that population data 
are difficult to obtain and evaluate due to factors beyond the agency’s control that affect 
populations. 
 
The Department believes that it is best to focus the agency’s monitoring program 
on habitat on NFS land where the agency can adjust management to meet the 
needs of certain species.  Desired conditions are often a focus of the monitoring 
program.  The agency will identify species-of-concern and species-of-interest. . . .   
Where ecological conditions for these species are identified as desired conditions, 
the habitat could be monitored to assist in avoiding future listing of these 
species.227 
 
The regulations do not prohibit population monitoring, and the agency may require it in 
as-yet undefined “appropriate” circumstances.228  But Forest Service directives issued 
after the 2005 planning regulations take the position that, “[f]or most species, the only 
practicable quantitative evaluation is assessment of habitat conditions.”229 
                                                 
222
 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (2000).  See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. 
223
 See 70 Fed. Reg. at 1029 (describing Option 1 of the proposed rule). 
224
 Id. 
225
 Id. 
226
 Id.  In issuing the directives that elaborate on the 2005 planning regulations, the Forest Service 
explained that, although “[t]he viability standard will no longer be used,” Forest Service directives will 
continue to require that planners identify listed species, species-of-concern, and species-of-interest; collect 
available data and information for those species, including population data; develop management direction 
for the species; and assess the effects of management actions.  71 Fed. Reg. at 5138. 
227
 70 Fed. Reg. at 1029. 
228
 Id. 
229
 FSH 1909.12, § 43.26.  See also Seidman & Burdin, supra note 139, at 43 (stating that, “[i]nstead of 
wasting valuable agency resources on the impractical task of attempting to inventory all species or even 
To be published at 83 Indiana L.J., Issue # 2 
U:\Word\articles\NFMA data gaps ssrn.doc 
glicksman Page 43 7/13/2007 
 
 More specifically, the 2005 regulations scrap both the MIS monitoring 
requirements imposed by the 1982 regulations and eliminate the provisions of the 2000 
regulations relating to focal species.230  In response to comments on the proposed rule 
suggesting that the final rule impose survey and monitoring requirements for MIS or 
focal species, the Forest Service explained that it chose not to require MIS monitoring 
because “recent scientific evidence identified flaws in the MIS concept.”231  According to 
the agency, that evidence refuted the notion that population trends for certain species 
could serve as surrogates for other species.232 
 
The Forest Service also rejected the concept of focal species initially proposed by 
the Committee of Scientists and adopted in the 2000 planning regulations based on its 
conclusion that that concept “is untested and it would not be prudent to potentially make 
the same mistake with focal species as was made with MIS in the 1982 planning rule.”233  
The agency conceded, however, that the premise that focal species can serve “as 
indicators of the ecological conditions may have merit” and stated that Forest Service 
directives might use focal species “as a tool to identify monitoring approaches to assess 
progress towards achieving the desired condition articulated in a plan.”234 
 
The Forest Service directives issued subsequent to the 2005 planning regulations 
state that it is important to identify species listed under the ESA, species-of-concern, and 
species-of-interest that are present in the plan area and gather existing information about 
them.  One directive provides: 
                                                                                                                                                 
representative indicator species, the Service has recognized that healthy and diverse ecosystems are the best 
indicator of healthy wildlife populations”). 
230
 The regulations contain special provisions applicable to NFS units governed by plans developed under 
the 1982 planning rules.  Planning officials may meet MIS obligations by considering data and analysis 
related to habitat, unless the plan specifically requires population monitoring or population surveys.  36 
C.F.R. § 219.14(f) (2006); 70 Fed. Reg. at 1052.  The Forest Service explained: 
Providing explicitly for MIS monitoring flexibility will allow for monitoring of habitat conditions 
as a surrogate for population trend data. It is appropriate for a range of methods to be available to 
estimate, or approximate, population trends for MIS. The Responsible Official will determine 
which monitoring method or combination of monitoring methods to use for a given MIS. 
Id.  Even when planning officials decide to conduct actual population monitoring for MIS, the preamble to 
the 2005 regulations expresses a preference for using a sampling program instead of a total enumeration.  
Id.  See Navajo Nation  v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 881 (D. Ariz. 2006) (confirming that, 
under § 219.14(f), the Forest Service has “the option to utilize habitat data as to any obligation regarding 
MIS”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, and remanded, 479 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2007). 
231
 70 Fed. Reg. at 1048.  The Forest Service added: 
Other tools can often be useful and more appropriate in predicting the effects of projects that 
implement a land management plan (such as examining the effect of proposed activities on the 
habitat of specific species); using information identified, obtained, or developed through a variety 
of methods (such as assessments, analysis, and monitoring results); or using information obtained 
from other sources (such as State fish and wildlife agencies and organizations like The Nature 
Conservancy). 
Id. at 1052. 
232
 Id. at 1048 (stating that through time, it “was found not to be the case” that “population trends for 
certain species that were monitored could represent trends for other species”). 
233
 Id. 
234
 Id. 
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However, in many cases it will be impractical to consider each species 
individually in the planning process.  Therefore, the Responsible Official may 
identify a manageable subset of species on which to focus species conservation 
measures and evaluation in the plan, plan amendment, or plan revision.  For this 
purpose, species groups and/or surrogate species may be used as an evaluation 
and analysis tool to improve planning efficiency and for development of plan 
components.  When groups of species have been identified, one or more species 
within each group may be selected to serve as surrogates for the ecological 
condition for other species in the group, or surrogate species may be selected 
based on other concepts such as umbrella species, keystone species, ecological 
indicators, and so forth.  If species groups and/or surrogate species are used, 
clearly describe the process for identifying groups or surrogates including critical 
assumptions and the uncertainty of conclusions.  Explain why assumptions are 
reasonable and why the degree of uncertainty is acceptable.  Identification and use 
of surrogate species is strictly an analysis and evaluation tool that may be used to 
improve planning.235 
 
Even when surrogates are used in the manner described in the directive, however, 
“[t]here are no monitoring or inventory requirements for surrogate species.”236  Before it 
issued the final directives that expand upon the 2005 planning regulations, the Forest 
Service was urged by commenters to identify criteria for identifying surrogate species 
and to describe how this tool will be used in the forest planning process.  The Agency’s 
response was simply that, “[a]s with any other approach used in NFMA planning, species 
grouping and the selection of surrogates must take into account the best available science 
and applicable portions of the Data Quality Act (44 U.S.C. 3516). An approach that does 
not satisfy these criteria would not be used.”237 
 
In short, the 2005 planning regulations as well as the directives subsequently 
issued by the Forest Service neither “anticipate gathering population data for developing 
a plan,” specify the types of data needed to implement LRMPs, nor prescribe any 
requirements for monitoring of any resource.  Instead, “[t]he types and amount of data 
needed will be determined by [planning officials] taking into account best available 
science.”238  In deciding what resources to monitor and in selecting the methods for doing 
so, the agency has indicated that it intends to afford priority to circumstances that present 
“a high degree of uncertainty associated with management assumptions.”239 
 
    (3) Evaluation of the 2005 Planning Regulations 
 
                                                 
235
 FSH 1909.12, § 43.24.  The directive also explains that “one or more species within each macrohabitat 
group may be selected as surrogates if they can be demonstrated to represent the ecological conditions for 
all species in the group” and that “[i]f the needs of surrogate species are met, then most needs of other 
species within the habitat group should also be met.”  Id. 
236
 Id. 
237
 71 Fed. Reg. at 5141. 
238
 Id. at 5137 (emphasis added). 
239
 Id. (quoting FSH 1909.12, § 12.1). 
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 The 2005 planning regulations depart from the rules that governed NFMA 
planning from 1982 to 2000 and from the 2000 planning rules, had they ever gone into 
effect, in several significant ways relevant to the implementation of the NFMA’s 
diversity requirement.  First, the regulations provide equal emphasis on the social, 
economic, and ecological components of sustainability, whereas the 2000 regulations 
clearly identified restoration and maintenance of ecological sustainability as the 
preeminent goal of the NFMA planning process. 
 
Second, they represent a marked shift from a mandate that planning officials 
assess the consequences of management actions at both the ecosystem and species levels.  
Although the 2005 regulations do not ignore species diversity, the default rule is that 
protection of ecosystem diversity will serve as an adequate mechanism for protecting 
species diversity as well.  Planning officials must adopt mechanisms to provide specific 
protection for species-of-concern or species-of-interest only if they conclude that 
particular conditions in the planning area make it impossible for protection of ecosystem 
diversity to also achieve the goal of species diversity.   
 
Third, the 2005 regulations eliminate the viability requirement contained in the 
1982 regulations.  According to the Forest Service, the species viability requirement 
diverted the agency’s attention away from the more important task of protecting diversity 
at the ecosystem level.  In addition, it was burdensome for planners to monitor the effect 
of management actions on a large number of species, and the effort resulted in “mixed 
success” at any rate.  As two observers have indicated, the 2005 planning regulations 
reflect the Forest Service’s attempt 
 
to resolve the habitat-based versus population-based wildlife management 
dilemma by abandoning the “species viability” approach and by selecting the goal 
of maintaining or enhancing ecosystem diversity as “the primary means by which 
a [forest] plan contributes to sustaining ecological systems” to provide for 
diversity of plant and animal communities.  The agency asserts that the more 
effectively it maintains the ecosystem, the less it will need to analyze and plan at 
the “species level of ecological organization.”240 
 
It is not clear, however, whether the 2005 planning regulations install sufficient 
monitoring or evaluation requirements to provide a meaningful check in the context of 
particular decisions on the accuracy of the agency’s assumption that protection of 
diversity at the ecosystem level will suffice to insure the protection of species-level 
diversity as well.241 
 
                                                 
240
 Seidman & Burdin, supra note 139, at 42. 
241
 See Jeffrey Rudd, The Forest Service’s Epistemic Judgments:  Enhancing Transparency to Ensure 
“New Knowledge” Informs Agency Decision-Making Processes, XXII TEMPLE ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 145, 
198 (2004) (asserting that “[i]n the absence of an assessment of species diversity, the agency will be unable 
to determine whether ecosystem level diversity provides the degree of species diversity protection 
necessary to maintain a sustainable ecological system” and urging the Forest Service to “conduct species 
level analysis in order to conclude that the ecosystem level plan complies with NFMA’s species diversity 
requirements”). 
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Fourth, consistent with the Forest Service’s focus on ecosystem as opposed to 
species diversity, the 2005 regulations eliminate the requirement that planning officials 
engage in population monitoring of any kind, although they permit such monitoring to be 
conducted under individual plans.  The regulations abandon the concept of MIS, 
characterizing it as a “flawed” method for using limited information to predict the 
consequences of management actions on the forest as a whole.  The regulations also back 
away from the designation of focal species, which were an important component of the 
2000 regulations, because the Forest Service deems the concept to be untested and 
imprudent. 
 
The 2005 regulations, however, do not abandon the technique of using surrogate 
components of the resources in the plan area to simulate the effect of management actions 
on the broader ecosystem.  On the one hand, the Forest Service justified throwing out the 
use of MIS on the ground that recent scientific evidence refuted the premise that 
population trends for individual species can serve as surrogates for the trends of other 
species.242  On the other hand, because it is impractical to consider each species 
individually in the planning process, the Forest Service directives permit planners to 
identify a “manageable subset of species on which to focus conservation measures and 
evaluation in the plan” and to use species groups or surrogate species as evaluative and 
analytical tools.243  It is not clear why the Forest Service believes that such techniques 
will provide useful information, even assuming that the agency provides forthright 
descriptions of the uncertainties involved in the selection of the surrogates,244 if the 
premise that tracking population trends for surrogate species can simulate trends for the 
ecosystem in which they live has been found “not to be the case.”245 
 
A particularly troublesome component of the new approach to reliance on 
surrogates is the statement contained in Forest Service directives that, in selecting 
surrogates, Forest Service personnel must take into account not only the best available 
science, but also “applicable portions of the Data Quality Act” (also known as the 
Information Quality Act (IQA).  That statute requires that all federal agencies comply 
with guidelines issued by the Office of Management and Budget to ensure and maximize 
“the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information (including statistical 
information) disseminated by federal agencies.”246  The IQA has served as a tool by 
which those opposed to the imposition of environmental protection measures have sought 
to delay implementation of those measures and to censor information with which they 
disagree or which they would rather not be disseminated because of its potential to put 
their activities in a bad light.  The IQA has become a basis for challenging agency efforts 
to protect the public health and the environment by casting decisions made despite the 
                                                 
242
 See 70 Fed. Reg. at 1048. 
243
 FSH 1909.12, § 43.24. 
244
 One observer, however, has expressed a fear that due to “[t]he inherent limitations in the process of 
producing scientific knowledge[,] . . . Forest Service administrators will justify as “scientific” claims that 
mask the level of uncertainty recognized by the broader scientific community.”  Rudd, supra note 241, at 
165. 
245
 70 Fed. Reg. at 1048. 
246
 Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3516 note). 
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existence of scientific uncertainty as decisions based on “bad science.”247  Scientific 
uncertainty is a pervasive attribute of environmental regulation, and its existence does not 
necessarily reflect unsubstantiated decisions or decisions based on unsound science.248  
The incorporation of IQA procedures into the NFMA process for protecting biodiversity 
appears to be a prescription for imposing shackles on efforts by the Forest Service to use 
the planning process to impose new constraints on resource extraction activities or other 
uses with the potential to interfere with the restoration or protection of biodiversity.249 
 
Moreover, the Forest Service has not abandoned the use of surrogates as 
predictors of the effects of management actions on biodiversity.  Rather, it has redefined 
the surrogate.  Instead of assessing the impact of management actions on individual or 
focal species to determine whether the actions will frustrate the statutory requirements of 
protecting plant and animal diversity, the Forest Service has chosen in most cases to 
proceed on the basis of the assumption that assessing the impact of management actions 
on species habitat, and taking measures to protect that habitat, will enable planners to 
comply with the NFMA mandate that plant and animal diversity be protected through the 
planning process.  The Forest Service has thus resorted to the proxy-on-proxy approach it 
began using under the 1982 regulations when it concluded that the monitoring of MIS 
was too burdensome. The substitution of the proxy-on-proxy approach for the MIS-based 
approach is problematic.  Despite ongoing debate over how to define a species,250 it may 
be even more difficult for scientists to agree on the definition of an ecosystem and on 
how to measure its vitality.251  The more abstract the measurement chosen to represent 
                                                 
247
 Sidney A. Shapiro et al., Ossifying Ossification:  Why the Information Quality Act Should Not Provide 
for Judicial Review, Center for Progressive Reform White Paper 601 (Feb. 2006), at 2-3, available at  
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/CPR_IQA_601.pdf. 
248
 Sidney A. Shapiro, The Data Quality Appropriations Ride:  New Procedures and Information 
Disclosure, Center for Progressive Reform Perspective (2005) (arguing that there is a “crucial distinction 
between incomplete data and poor quality data”), available at 
http://www.progressivereform.org/perspectives/dataQuality.cfm. 
249
 Cf. Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB's Dubious Peer Review Procedures, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 
10064 (2004) (arguing that the IQA creates a procedural apparatus that is likely to stifle the government’s 
efforts to provide useful information to the public about their safety and health risks and about risks to the 
environment).  See generally Stephen M. Johnson, Junking the ‘Junk Science’ Law: Reforming the 
Information Quality Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 37 (2006); Sidney A. Shapiro, The Information Quality Act 
and Environmental Protection: The Perils of Reform by Appropriations Rider, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. 
& POL'Y REV. 339 (2004); Sidney A. Shapiro, The Case Against the IQA, 22 ENVTL. F. # 4 (July/August 
2005), at 26; Michelle V. Lacko, Comment, The Data Quality Act: Prologue to A Farce or A Tragedy?, 53 
EMORY L.J. 305 (2004). 
250
 J. B. Ruhl, The Battle Over Endangered Species Act Methodology, 34 ENVTL. L. 555, 576 n.57 (2004) 
(“The scientific consensus on 'species' ... is that no complete consensus exists and that different definitions 
suit different purposes.") (quoting Blake Hood, Transgenic Salmon and the Definition of "Species" Under 
the Endangered Species Act, 18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 75, 78 (2002)); Anna L. George & Richard L. 
Mayden, Species Concepts and the Endangered Species Act:  How A Valid Biological Definition of Species 
Enhances the Legal Protection of Biodiversity, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 369, 369 (2005) (stating that “[t]here 
is no single accepted definition of a ‘species’ in the natural sciences”). 
251
 Susan Harrison, Biodiversity and Wilderness:  The Need for Systematic Protection of Biological 
Diversity, 25 J. LAND, RESOURCES, & ENVTL. L. 53, 56 (2005) (“Academic ecology is full of unresolved 
debates, however, over the degree to which communities or ecosystems are real entities with objectively 
definable boundaries and in what ways their functional properties depend on their component species.”).  
Cf. Kristin Carden, Bridging the Divide: The Role of Science in Species Conservation Law, 30 HARV. 
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plant and animal diversity within a forest, the more likely it is that agencies can base 
management decisions on undisclosed value judgments rather than falsifiable scientific 
hypotheses.  The status of the habitat of an MIS appears less concrete than a specification 
of the rise or fall in MIS populations. 
 
Fifth, the regulations introduce the concept of planning based upon a vague, 
process-based “best available science” mandate.  The regulations require that planners 
identify scientific uncertainty and how it might affect planning decisions.  Although the 
2002 proposed regulations would have required planners to base their decisions on the 
best available science, the final regulations only require than the agency “take into 
account” the best available science, and the Forest Service has acknowledged that science 
provides only one of many factors upon which it will make its planning decisions.  There 
is nothing inherently wrong with a process-based approach to the protection of 
biodiversity.  There is also merit, as discussed below,252 to the idea that the Forest Service 
maintain flexibility in its efforts to protect biodiversity so that it can respond quickly and 
effectively to changes in the state of scientific knowledge.  Both the use of a procedure-
based definition of diversity and the movement into agency directives of most of the 
detailed prescriptions, substantive and procedural, for protecting biodiversity in the 
NFMA planning process, are designed to achieve that freedom to respond to 
circumstances as they develop. 
 
The Forest Service Manual and the Forest Service Handbook are likely to be less 
accessible than agency regulations, however, and some people interested in Forest 
Service management may not even know about them.253  If the agency’s decisions are 
being guided by standards and procedures shielded from public view, efforts to provide 
meaningful input into Forest Service planning decisions may be frustrated.254  That result 
seems contrary to the spirit if not the letter of what the statute demands of the agency.  It 
requires the Forest Service to “provide for public participation” in the development of 
LRMPs255 and provides that, in exercising his or her authority under the NFMA, the 
Secretary of Agriculture establish procedures to give the public adequate notice of and 
opportunity to comment on the formulation of standards and criteria applicable to Forest 
Service programs.256  It is hard enough for interested members of the public to provide 
informed and useful input when the issues are as technical as they typically are in 
determining the appropriate framework for approving management actions involving 
forest lands and resources.  It is harder still for such persons to play the role Congress 
envisioned for them if the decisions are governed by criteria that are not readily available. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
ENVTL. L. REV. 165, 216 (2006) (asserting that, “even given unlimited time, the complex, diverse, and 
dynamic nature of ecosystems does not lend itself to our full understanding”). 
252
 See infra notes 281-7 and accompanying text. 
253
 The directives are accessible through the Forest Service’s official website, at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/im/directives.  
254
 Cf. Rudd, supra note 241, at 164 (asserting that “the regulations shield from view the scientific process 
of knowledge production and its relationship to the Service's responsibility to honor that process”). 
255
 16 U.S.C. § 1604(d). 
256
 16 U.S.C. § 1612(a). 
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The barriers to informed participation in Forest Service planning efforts may even 
reduce the utility of input from the scientific community outside the agency, particularly 
in light of the possibility that the agency may not be receptive to interpretations of the 
“available” science that conflict with their own.257  The Forest Service did not even 
convene a Committee of Scientists before promulgating the 2005 regulations, in contrast 
to the practices followed in the development of both the 1982 and 2000 planning 
regulations,258 and in apparent violation of the NFMA’s requirement that the agency 
convene and solicit input from a Committee as part of the process of implementing the 
planning process.259 
 
Far more worrisome than the accessibility of these directives, however, is their 
legal status.  Although the courts have reacted differently when asked to characterize the 
status of Forest Service directives, some cases support the conclusion that the FSM and 
the FSH lack the force and effect of law, are not binding upon the agency, and cannot be 
enforced by private litigants in suits against the Forest Service.  The Ninth Circuit, for 
example, concluded that the FSM “does not rise to the status of a regulation” and 
evidently need not be followed by the agency.260  The courts have reached similar results 
in assessing the status of the FSH.261  If the Forest Service directives do not bind the 
agency in its NFMA planning decisions, the 2005 regulations have moved in the direction 
of vesting in the agency relatively unconstrained discretion in deciding how to implement 
the NFMA’s diversity mandate, particularly given the vagueness and brevity (compared 
to the 1982 and 2000 planning regulations) of the regulations themselves concerning 
what the agency is required to do to restore and maintain plant and animal diversity.  This 
                                                 
257
 Rudd charges that 
one of the fundamental problems with the Forest Service's reliance upon “science” to justify its 
management decisions [is that the] present institutional relationship between the Forest Service 
and the remainder of the scientific community fails to ensure “equality of intellectual authority 
among qualified practitioners.”  The Forest Service's choice of a “scientific” claim, theory, or 
technique over a conflicting knowledge claim results from an epistemic judgment about the 
relative values of the competing claims to address the problem at hand.  The Service is not 
required to support its judgment with direct appeal to the broader scientific community’s views 
concerning the knowledge claims’ soundness. 
Rudd, supra note 241, at 179. 
258
 See Flournoy et al., supra note 170, at 3, 4 (describing the input provided by the Committees convened 
prior to issuance of the 1982 and 2000 regulations). 
259
 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h)(1) provides that, in carrying out the purposes of § 1604(g), which requires the 
Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations governing the planning process, the Secretary “shall 
appoint a committee of scientists who are not officers or employees of the Forest Service.” 
260
 Hi-Ridge Lumber Co. v. United States, 443 F.2d 452, 454-55 (9th Cir. 1971).  See also Big Meadows 
Grazing Ass’n v. United States, 344 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 2003); Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. 
United States Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 1996); Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570, 585 
(2002) (stating that agency manuals lack “the force of law”). 
261
 See, e.g., Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council, 148 F.3d 1231, 1243 n.11 (11th Cir. 1998).  See also W. 
Radio Serv. Co. v. Espy, 79 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that neither the FSM nor the FSH has the 
independent force and effect of law because they are not substantive in nature, are not promulgated in 
accordance with the procedures specified in the Administrative Procedure Act, and are not issued pursuant 
to an independent grant of congressional authority); City of Williams v. Dombeck, 151 F. Supp. 2d 9, 22 
(D.D.C. 2001) (concluding that neither the FSM nor the FSH is mandatory because they were never 
published in the Code of Federal Regulations). 
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move toward decreased accountability is regrettable.262  Finally, the directives provide 
little solace in that they state at one point that the agency’s assessment of ecosystem 
diversity should “inform” planning decisions, rather than that the assessment will 
determine, or even play a significant role in determining, the outcome of the planning 
process.263 
 
The degree to which the 2005 planning regulations conform to or deviate from the 
NFMA’s dictate that LRMPs be developed in a manner that provides for the diversity of 
plant and animal communities probably will be decided in the crucible of litigation.  The 
regulations did not settle the controversy over whether the statute mandates a species-
based protection effort or allows the Forest Service to focus on habitat maintenance.  
Likewise, the policy debate has not been stilled.264  Environmental groups have sued the 
Forest Service, challenging the validity of the 2005 regulations on both substantive and 
procedural grounds.265 In the first round of litigation, a federal district court in California 
enjoined implementation of the 2005 regulations and remanded to the agency.266 The 
court instructed the Forest Service to comply with notice and comment rulemaking 
procedures set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, the environmental assessment 
requirements of NEPA, and the consultation requirements of the ESA, all of which the 
agency contravened in issuing the regulations.267 The court did not address the 
substantive validity of the regulations, including the provisions bearing on the Forest 
Service’s responsibility under the NFMA to protect plant and animal diversity. 
 
IV. A GENERIC SET OF CRITERIA FOR MANAGING BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND 
SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY THROUGH MODELING AND THE USE OF SURROGATES 
 
The controversy over the Forest Service’s evolving approaches to fulfilling its 
responsibility under the NFMA to protect biodiversity provides an opportunity to assess 
what a regulatory program for making science-based decisions in the face of scientific 
uncertainty should look like.  This part of the article argues that such a regulatory 
program should be realistic, collaborative, transparent, and flexible, and should install 
mechanisms for insuring that the agency responsible for implementing the program may 
be held accountable. 
 
The necessity of making environmental and natural resource management policy 
decisions despite the presence of considerable scientific uncertainty about the need for 
and effects of such decisions will not disappear any time soon.  As the stakes of waiting 
                                                 
262
 See infra notes 298-303 for a discussion of the importance of agency accountability in the use of models 
or other surrogate simulations. 
263
 FSH 1909.12, § 43.1. 
264
 See Seidman & Burdin, supra note 136, at 44 (asserting that the 2005 regulations “appear to have simply 
fanned the flames of the controversy over forest wildlife management strategies”). 
265
 The claims raised by the plaintiffs include allegations that the Forest Service violated applicable notice 
and comment rulemaking requirements, improperly failed to include adequate decisionmaking standards 
regarding wildlife protection, failed to support its decision to “abandon” the species viability requirement, 
and violated NEPA by refusing to prepare an environmental impact statement on the regulations.  See id. 
266
 Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
267
 Id. at 1110-01. 
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until all of the “necessary” information is available get higher in resolving issues such as 
how to combat global climate change, the need to make expeditious but informed 
decisions before the decisionmaker has eliminated doubt only grows stronger.268  
Agencies responsible for restraining the potentially harmful activities of industrial and 
governmental polluters and for acting as stewards of publicly owned resources, and the 
legislatures that delegate decisionmaking authority to such agencies, therefore must avoid 
falling into the trap of believing that there is “an” optimal answer to a particular 
environmental policy problem, and that if we wait long enough, science will provide us 
with the information necessary to ascertain what that answer is and then allow us to put it 
into effect.  Uncertainty can easily be used, and unfortunately has been in many 
environmental policy debates in the past, as “an excuse for inactivity, citing that ‘more 
research is needed before a sound decision is made.’”269  Bounded rationality is here to 
stay.  The task at hand is not eliminating it, but reducing it to manageable proportions 
through research and the use of simulation techniques, such as modeling, so that 
reasonably informed judgments can be made about the relative merits of the competing 
alternative policy choices. 
 
Environmental agencies will continue to rely on models (like the dose-response 
assessment models that permit extrapolation of animal test data on toxic chemicals down 
to the levels of likely human exposure, or the identification of MIS or focal species to 
serve as surrogates for the effect of the management alternatives being considered on the 
larger ecosystem of which they are a part) to help them close the data gaps they face in 
making policy judgments.  In doing so, they should be careful not to cordon themselves 
off from those who might provide useful input on the potential flaws in their modeling 
exercises and on the availability of alternative means of managing bounded rationality.270  
Agencies can isolate themselves either by making their decisions in secret, without 
                                                 
268
 See Rose, supra note 1, at 294 (arguing that, “more than ever, policymakers cannot wait until scientific 
evidence is conclusive; instead, they often have to make up their minds while the data is still tentative”). 
269
 Eric Wolanski et al., Mud, Marine Snow and Coral Reefs, 91 AMERICAN SCIENTIST 44 (Jan. 1, 2003), 
2003 WLNR 13226176.  The authors, who made this comment in discussing ecosystem models, assert that 
“the major impediment at this point appears to be political will.”  Id.  Cf. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. 
Evans, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1131-32 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (criticizing agency subject to mandate to make 
decisions based on the “best available science” for characterizing new study as “junk science” as a pretext 
for ignoring it), appeal dismissed sub nom. Oceana, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 457 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2006). Cf. 
Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 484 F.3d 1123, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that agency’s finding that 
yellowfin tuna fishery was not having an adverse impact on dolphin populations, which was supposed to be 
based solely on the best available science under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and was couched in 
those terms, was instead improperly influenced by international political concerns). 
270
 According to a critic of the 2005 planning regulations: 
Although models may serve an important instrumental purpose, and “case studies may provide the 
best approach to applied ecology,” both approaches are subject to the influence of bias and 
assumption.  Theoretical models’ assumptions risk the loss of specific knowledge about a 
particular ecosystem or species in an attempt to demonstrate “exceptionless laws.”  Case-studies’ 
background assumptions may sacrifice general knowledge transferable across study areas in favor 
of detailed, local knowledge claims. 
Rudd, supra note 241, at 207. See generally ORRIN H. PILKEY & LINDA PILKEY-JARVIS, USELESS 
ARITHMETIC: WHY ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENTISTS CAN’T PREDICT THE FUTURE (2007) (contending that 
mathematical models used to make scientific determinations yield results that depart from reality due to 
factors such as erroneous assumptions and the reluctance to check predictions against natural outcomes). 
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soliciting the views of knowledgable experts and lay persons, or by framing the debate in 
terms that are so technical that the world of potentially useful contributors becomes 
extremely small. 
 
By combating this tendency and welcoming rather than dreading the possibility 
that other experts have insights not yet developed by agency scientists, the agency 
provides itself with an opportunity to reduce the level of uncertainty surrounding its 
decision.  Indeed, the “best available science” standard contained in the 2005 regulations 
is fully consistent with the idea that agencies should reach out for expert advice if it is 
interpreted as imposing on the agency an affirmative obligation to make reasonable 
efforts (but not efforts so onerous as to cripple the agency’s ability to act within a 
reasonable time frame) to supplement the existing knowledge base.271 
 
There is some evidence that at least one court has begun to adopt a similar 
approach in assessing the Forest Service’s compliance with the 2005 regulations.  In an 
NFMA-based  challenge to the validity of a logging project governed by the “best 
available science” mandate, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that the 
Forest Service complied with the statute and regulations and remanded to the district 
court with instructions to vacate the Forest Service’s approval of the project.272 The 
Forest Service asserted that it followed the best available science, contending that it has 
the discretion to decide what constitutes the best available science.273 The court rejected 
that claim, however, concluding instead that the 2005 regulations “underscore that the 
‘best available science’ is not just whatever the Forest Service finds on the shelf.”274 The 
court was troubled by the Forest Service’s selective reliance on a 1992 Forest Service 
report and in particular its contention that the court was obliged to deer to the agency’s 
expertise whenever its conclusions differed from those in the report.275  The court 
invalidated the logging project because, on the record before it, it was unable to 
determine whether the Forest Service satisfied the best available science mandate.  It 
suggested that, on remand, the Forest Service look to the practice of agencies governed 
by other statutes (including the ESA, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery and Conservation and Management Act) that require agencies to base 
their decisions on the best available science. The court read the cases and regulations 
interpreting those other statutes as clearly absolving the Forest Service of the need to 
collect new data, but as requiring that it “seek out and collect all existing scientific 
evidence relevant to the decision” and prohibiting it from ignoring existing data.276  
                                                 
271
 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that Congress imposes “best 
available science” mandates as a means of requiring such affirmative, information-gathering efforts); 
Doremus, Best Available Science Mandate, supra note 34, at 30-31 (urging both agencies and courts to 
“return to the earlier interpretation that section 7 [of the ESA] imposes an obligation on the action agency 
to provide any reasonably obtainable information”). 
272
 The Ecology Ctr. v. United States Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2006). 
273
 Id. at 1193. 
274
 Id. 
275
 Id. 
276
 Id. at 1194-95 n.4 (quoting Heartwood, Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., 380 F.3d 428, 436 (8th Cir. 
2004)). 
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Notably, it also established that “the best available politics does not equate to the best 
available science.”277 
 
The Tenth Circuit subsequently invalidated timber sales in two additional cases 
based on the Forest Service’s noncompliance with the best available science mandate.  In 
one case, the court concluded that the agency provided no evidence that it used the best 
available science in approving the project.278  In the other, the court found it “obvious” 
that the agency did not satisfy its obligations to base approval of the logging project on 
the best available scientific evidence and rejected the district court’s conclusion that the 
error was harmless due to the agency’s reliance on other available data.279  The 
administrative record contained no indication that the Forest Service ever considered its 
best available science obligations before approving the timber sales.280  These precedents 
may presage a refusal on the part of the courts to rubber-stamp the Forest Service’s 
findings on whether individual projects were properly based on the best available science. 
 
The fear that agency scientists will close themselves off from the potentially 
conflicting views of experts on the outside is apparently a legitimate one in the context of 
decisionmaking to preserve biodiversity.  According to one account, “[o]ver the last 50 
years, it appears that sections of the wildlife discipline have developed a certain 
subculture that is not inclined to release strategic wildlife and habitat data on which 
decisions are based.”281  The NFMA provides at last two concrete mechanisms for 
combating any tendency of agency scientists to cut themselves off from potentially 
dissenting views.  First, as indicated above, the statute requires the Secretary of 
Agriculture to convene and seek input from a Committee of Scientists when the Forest 
Service embarks on the process of amending the planning regulations.282  Second, the 
statute requires that, in providing for public participation in the planning for and 
management of the national forests, the Secretary “shall establish and consult such 
advisory boards as he deems necessary to secure full information and advice on the 
execution of his responsibilities.”283  Those boards must reflect a cross-section of groups 
interested in planning and management decisions governing the use and enjoyment of the 
national forests.284  The Forest Service should scrupulously follow these solicitation 
requirements, and other environmental and natural resource management agencies should 
likewise create or take advantage of procedures that allow them to collaborate with 
experts outside the agency before deciding how to narrow the relevant data gaps that 
seem to pose obstacles to informed policy judgments.  As one critic of the 2005 planning 
regulations has argued: 
 
                                                 
277
 Id. at 1194 n.4 (quoting Midwater Trawlers Co-Op. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 282 F.3d 710, 720 (9th Cir. 
2002)). 
278
 Utah Envtl. Cong. V. Richmond, 483 F.3d 1127, 1135-37 (10th Cir. 2007). 
279
 Id. at 1287.  Interestingly, the court noted that the Forest Service “relied solely on MIS-based analysis in 
approving these three projects.”  Id. 
280
 Id. at 1288. 
281
 Huetmann, supra note 65, at 470. 
282
 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h)(1). 
283
 16 U.S.C. § 1612(b). 
284
 Id. 
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The objectivity of the science-based judgments required by the “best available 
science” regulation will only be established through interactive discourse between 
the agency and the broader scientific community; i.e., through the process of 
“transformative criticism.”  Scientific “consistency checks” will limit the 
introduction of arbitrary or subjective preferences undermining the scientific 
knowledge production process and its reasonable impact on Forest Service 
planning decisions.285 
 
He adds that “the influence of bias and authoritarian tendencies will only be prevented by 
transparent and collaborative decision-making processes.”286 
 
Agencies making science-based decisions in the face of bounded rationality must 
reach out to more than just the scientific experts, however.  Although scientific 
information is no doubt essential to an agency’s ability to make resource allocation 
decisions such as the ones at issue in the NFMA planning process, these decisions 
“cannot be divorced from underlying value-based considerations, including related 
political, economic, social, and aesthetic judgments,” especially when, as is often the 
case, scientific debate precludes the technical experts from settling upon a single, right 
answer.287  The solicitation of input from all interested members of the public, including 
but not limited to those subject to environmental regulation and those seeking permission 
to use public resources, is essential to the making of informed judgments on those extra-
scientific questions. 
 
Unless the agency explains its options in terms accessible to non-experts, it 
cannot hope to receive useful input on questions such as whether to monitor wildlife 
habitat through the use of a model that extrapolates from the effects of a decision on a 
single species to the effects of that decision on all species, or instead to focus on the 
effects of the decision on the habitat of a species or group of species.  Moreover, the 
agency should make efforts to distinguish between the scientific and non-scientific 
components of the relevant decision of whether and how to use a model or other 
simulation technique.288  Part of the agency’s full disclosure efforts ought to involve 
explaining the limits of the modeling approach being considered and describing the 
assumptions built into the model, and the policy judgments upon which those 
assumptions rest.289 
                                                 
285
 Rudd, supra note 241, at 186.  In particular, Rudd argues that the Forest Service must “(1) develop 
standards for reviewing relevant claims produced by the broader scientific community, and (2) design 
collaborative processes involving non-agency scientists to establish through transformative criticism the 
credibility of the agency's science-based positions.”  Id. at 186-87. 
286
 Id. at 187. 
287
 Keiter, supra note 111, at 324.  See also Holly Doremus, Natural Resource Management in the Bush 
Administration, 32 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 249, 299-303 (2005). 
288
 See, e.g., Doremus, Listing Decisions, supra note 31, at 1130-31 (arguing that, “[i]nstead of remaining 
hidden, the non-scientific elements of the listing decision should be consigned to a more openly political 
process,” and that  “[s]uch a process would permit the airing of all relevant viewpoints, provide a forum to 
educate the public concerning the range of benefits provided by species, and ultimately provide a more 
solid political foundation for conservation policy”). 
289
 Larson et al., supra, note 132, at 116, argue that “[t]he validity of habitat suitability models may be 
questionable, and the direct effects of variation in habitat suitability on wildlife vital rates are often 
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In addition to being realistic, collaborative, and transparent, any decisionmaking 
process that relies on models or similar simulation techniques to mitigate the difficulty 
that bounded rationality imposes on agency decisionmakers should be flexible.  Because, 
by definition, the situations in which models are used involve scientific uncertainty, the 
existing body of relevant knowledge is likely to change over time.  It makes no sense, 
therefore, to create an approach to addressing bounded rationality that is set in concrete.  
Rather, what is needed is a decisionmaking process that allows the agency to adjust its 
approach to conform to new information.290 
 
One means of providing such flexibility (although some have characterized it as a 
“trendy” one)  is adaptive management. 291  As Brad Karkkainen has explained: 
 
The argument for adaptive management proceeds from the recognition that 
conventional environmental regulation and natural resource management operate 
piecemeal, attempting to fraction ecological complexes into smaller, putatively 
manageable components, and parceling out management responsibilities among 
mission specific agencies and programs.292 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
unknown.  It is important, therefore, that model users evaluate these uncertainties and make them explicit, 
so model results can be interpreted appropriately.”   See also Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 971 
(contending that “[a] public participant cannot effectively scrutinize a model-based decision without having 
some understanding of the uncertainties involved, and both modelers and planners therefore ought to be 
explicit and comprehensive in their discussions of uncertainty”); Kann & Weyant, supra  note 39, at 29 
(urging modelers to lay out assumptions inherent in different models explicitly and be more explicit about 
the level of confidence they have in model outputs).  Fine and Owen add that “[a] modeling prediction 
unqualified by disclosure of known, or knowable, sources of error is fundamentally deceptive.  It conveys a 
level of certainty that does not exist, hides real risks, and fails to explain key information that ought to be 
factored into policy choices and decisions.   Without such information, public debate may be pointless.”  Id. 
at 972. 
290
 See, e.g., Tarlock, supra note 5, at 153 (urging the use of decisionmaking processes that “allow mid-
course corrections”); Doremus, Constitutive Law, supra note 1, at 375-76 (supporting “sufficient flexibility 
to permit [the agency] to respond to new information, changed conditions, and the progressively sharper 
conflicts that will inevitably characterize environmental problems”).  Jamison E. Colburn, The Indignity of 
Federal Wildlife Habitat Law, 57 ALA. L. REV. 417, 498 (2005), argues that federal wildlife habitat laws 
are not well suited in their current form to adapt to changing circumstances and to learning in light of 
experience and that “[a] more reflexive and pragmatic model is needed if we are to preserve much of the 
habitat our wildlife require.” For discussion of a variety of pragmatic approaches to environmental 
regulation and natural resource management that respond to the need for agencies to make decisions despite 
scientific uncertainty, see SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 21, at 147-77. 
291
 Bosselman, supra note 107, at 496-97.  On adaptive management, see generally J.B. Ruhl, Regulation 
by Adaptive Management — Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 21 (2005); J.B. Ruhl, Taking 
Adaptive Management Seriously:  A Case Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1249 
(2004); J.B. Ruhl, Is the Endangered Species Act Eco-Pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 885 (2003); J.B. Ruhl, 
Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System:  How to Clean Up the Environment by 
Making A Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933 (1997); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Panarchy 
and Adaptive Change:  Around the Loop and Back Again, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 59 (2005). 
292
 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults:  Towards A 
Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 945-46 (2003). 
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Conservation ecologists, among others, have supported the iterative approach reflected in 
an adaptive management-based decisionmaking regime, based on the recognition that the 
policy approaches developed to deal with questions such as how to protect plant and 
wildlife diversity are “inescapably provisional and experimental, subject to subsequent 
modification in response to new learning and changing conditions.”293  The idea is to use 
feedback from experience with the approach initially selected to “pragmatically and 
continuously adjust both ends and means in light of experience and learning.”294  The 
need for flexibility is particularly acute in the context of land and resource planning, 
which is designed to provide an ongoing framework for resource allocation decisions 
given that the state of the resources being managed is continuously in flux.295 
 
 The NFMA envisions precisely this sort of flexible, iterative management 
process.  It requires that the Forest Service’s regulations for developing LRMPs “insure 
research on and (based on continuous monitoring and assessment in the field) evaluation 
of the effects of each management system to the end that it will not produce substantial 
and permanent impairment of the productivity of the land.”296  The provisions of the 
directives that implement the portions of the 2005 planning regulations which deal with 
protection of biodiversity fare relatively well when judged under this criterion.  The FSH, 
for example, states that “[d]evelopment of plan components for ecosystem diversity and 
species diversity may be an iterative process”297 (although it would have been better to 
state that the process should or must be iterative).  The FSH also provides that such an 
iterative process “may suggest the need for refinement of a proposed plan . . . that would 
then require additional analysis.”298 
 
 An agency’s use of modeling or simulation techniques to facilitate its ability to 
make decisions in the face of scientific uncertainty must insure that the agency remains 
accountable for its choices.  Unless the agency is accountable for its decisions,  
the normative suggestions for decisionmaking in the face of scientific uncertainty 
discussed above will not amount to much.  The substantive output of agency modeling 
                                                 
293
 Id. at 943. 
294
 Id.  See also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward A Smarter NEPA:  Monitoring and Managing 
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907-08 (2002) [cited hereinafter as 
Karkkainen, Toward A Smarter NEPA] (contending that a shift “in the focus of information production 
from the uncertain and speculative realm of comprehensive ex ante prediction to the pragmatic empiricism 
of observation, measurement, and verification” through the use of management tools such as those that 
employ digital technologies “enable systematic error detection and correction, early identification of 
unforeseen circumstances, and ongoing advances in our understanding of complex natural systems”; as a 
result, decisionmaking can be situated “on a firmer pragmatic and empirically grounded footing, and 
expand the decisionmaker's capacity to learn and to adjust decisions over time”). 
295
 Cf. Bosselman, supra note 107, at 496-97 (stating that “organizations learned from practical experience 
that simple extrapolations of history and cadres of professional planners failed to lead to innovation, 
adaptation to change, or even survival”); Karkkainen, Toward A Smarter NEPA, supra note 294, at 965 
(arguing that “efforts at ecosystem management emphasize the need for experimentation and dynamic 
adjustment in response to new learning”); Rudd, supra note 241, at 167 (contending that “[t]he varying 
degrees of uncertainty characterizing the explanation and prediction of natural phenomena highlight the 
importance of continually evaluating models and theories in light of new evidence”). 
296
 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(C). 
297
 FSH 1909.12, § 43.26. 
298
 Id. 
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efforts is not likely to improve, for example, if the agency engages in a collaborative and 
transparent information-gathering and analytical process, only to blithely ignore the input 
it has received by reaching a predetermined result.  Accountability can take one of 
several forms.299  Congress has mechanisms, such as legislative oversight hearings and 
budgeting decisions, by which it can seek to avert or reverse agency decisions that 
frustrate legislative intent.  It is unlikely, however, that Forest Service decisions 
concerning the formulation and application of models for assessing the impact of agency-
approved management actions on biodiversity will surface on the legislative radar screen. 
 
Realistically, accountability for agency decisions involving modeling or related 
simulation techniques to fill scientific data gaps probably depends on meaningful judicial 
review.  The courts have shown the inclination and the capacity, despite the technical 
nature of the questions involved, to overturn decisions in which environmental agencies 
applied a model that bore “no rational relationship to the reality it purport[ed] to 
represent.”300  The courts traditionally adopted an extremely deferential posture to the 
review of Forest Service decisions, however, particularly when the agency made the 
challenged decisions under multiple use, sustained yield statutes such as the NFMA.301  
In one case involving an attack on Forest Service planning decisions, for example, the 
court required the plaintiffs to demonstrate that “there is virtually no evidence in the 
record to support the agency’s methodology.”302 
 
Reviewing courts have the capacity to play a more useful function in holding 
agencies accountable for science-based decisions than that.303  At a minimum, the courts 
must insist that agencies seeking to fill gaps in scientific knowledge through modeling-
type exercises abide strictly by whatever procedural devices Congress has chosen to 
impose upon them to facilitate transparent decisionmaking that is informed by input 
received through a process that allowed meaningful public participation.  Beyond that, 
the courts must require that the agencies provide explanations for their decisions that 
reveal the assumptions upon which their models proceeded, as well as descriptions of the 
remaining scientific uncertainties and how they affected the agency’s choices.  Finally, 
the courts should vacate or remand agency decisions in which the agency’s explanation 
fails to demonstrate that the model used is an appropriate one for dealing with the 
particular data gaps the agency is trying to fill or that a relevant model has been 
                                                 
299
 “Accountability can be roughly defined as the ability of one actor to demand an explanation or 
justification of another actor for its actions and to reward or punish that second actor on the basis of its 
performance or its explanation.”  Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Democratic 
Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2073 (2005). 
300
 Columbia Falls Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 139 F.3d 914, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting American Iron & 
Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).  See also supra notes 85-91and accompanying 
text. 
301
 See 3 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 96, at § 16:5 (stating that “administrative decisions authorized 
under multiple use, sustained yield statutes are at present almost unreviewable, even for abuse of 
discretion”). 
302
 Oregon Natural Res. Council v. Lowe, 836 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732 (D. Or. 1993). 
303
 See Rudd, supra note 241, at 149 (arguing that “[t]raditional judicial deference to the Forest Service’s 
decision-making processes on scientific issues is insufficient to ensure that scientific claims are fairly 
evaluated”). 
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misapplied.304 There is some preliminary evidence in the early decisions reviewing the 
Forest Service’s application of the 2005 planning regulations that the courts may be 
willing to undertake each of those tasks.305 
 
Finally, environmental and natural resource management agencies should take the 
position that when scientific uncertainty hinders their ability to predict the nature of the 
impact of their decisions on the public health or on the health of sustainable public 
natural resources such as those found in the national forests, despite reliance on modeling 
and evaluation of surrogate trends, the burden of justifying any activity that poses threats 
to those resources should be allocated to those who support agency approval of those 
activities.306  The potential for pollution or public natural resource development to 
impose irreparable harm should not be ignored or minimized simply because the nature 
of the effects of those activities is as of yet unascertainable.  Requiring those supporting 
agency actions with potentially damaging environmental effects to bear that burden is 
consistent with the thrust of much of the federal environmental and natural resource 
management legislation under which these decisions are made, which was adopted in 
large part to control speculative risks to health and the environment.307 
                                                 
304
 Rudd also suggests that courts supplement the administrative record by calling witnesses and impaneling 
experts to evaluate agency science-based decisions.  See id. at 149, 216-21. 
305
 See supra notes 272-80 and accompanying text. 
306
 See, e.g., A NEW PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT:  A PROJECT OF 
THE CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION 124 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Rena Steinzor eds., 2005) 
(stating that “[w]here uncertainty exists, the proponent of the potentially degrading activity should bear the 
burden of proving that the activity will not cause unacceptable adverse impacts”). 
307
 See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 750-51; Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land 
Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (quoting Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1454 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-697(1978), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2576)) 
(stating that, to the extent there is any scientific uncertainty as to what constitutes the “best available 
scientific information” for purposes of § 7(a)(2) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), Congress intended 
that the FWS, in issuing biological opinions under the ESA, “give the benefit of the doubt to the species”). 
